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 Abstract 
This is a study of conflict resolution in the Darfur region of Sudan that underpins the gross human 
rights violations by both the government forces and militia groups.The Darfur conflict constitute 
one of the known 21st century civil wars which resulted in the deaths and displacements of mainly 
the civilian population. In light of these human rights violations by the parties to the conflict, the 
government of Sudan was roundly condemned by the international community for its failure to 
protect civilians. The researcher will use the qualitative research method while the Constructivism 
theory will be used as the theoratical framework in conducting the research. An incisive finding by 
the research is that both the government forces and the rebel groups (militia) participated in the 
gross human rights violations during the conflict. On the international intervention, the study found 
that there is an element of selectivity by superpowers regarding their attention to humanitarian 
crisis. Little attention was given to the Darfur crisis than both in Cambodia and Afghanistan. The 
researcher in this context recommends that in order for a lasting peace and stability to be attained 
in the Darfur, both parties to the conflict have to engage and come up with a comprehensive peace 
agreement which has to be signed by all.The African Union is recommended to take a leading role 
in bringing the parties to the negotiation table.  
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 1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Broader Origins of Conflict 
The civil conflict in the Darfur region started in February 2003 as a result of two militant rebel groups, the 
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) who launched 
a series of military attacks on targeted government institutions such as police stations and military bases (de 
Waal 2007:17). It is however important to note that various factors that led to the implosion of the Darfur 
conflict have been chronicled extensively by a number of researchers who exposed the extent of the Sudanese 
government’s negligence to protecting the civilian population during the period of conflict  (Ahmed & 
Manger 2006).  
 
The Government of Sudan (GoS) led by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir in turn reacted by launching an 
indiscriminate massive counter-offensive attack on both the rebels as well as civilians in their communities 
by the military in collaboration with the Janjaweed militia (Slim 2004:810-800). The two rebel groups’ 
concerns included the marginalisation from socio-economic and political advancement of the region in spite 
of the government revenues from the sale of oil (Klay Kieh Jr n.d :48).  
 
The Darfurian population alleged that the country’s resources were being channelled to other regions of the 
country while Darfur was being neglected. The non-Arab population in the region also felt that they were 
being unfairly treated by the Khartoum government which prioritized the Arab ethnic groups both in the 
appointments of central government officials as well as in the provincial deployments. This in the end ignited 
ethnic conflicts which resulted from “superior-inferior myth”, between the two groups and ultimately 
establishing the hegemony of the Arab ethnic groups in the country (Klay Kieh Jr n.d :49). 
 
1.2 Rationale 
A number of factors are attributable to the researcher’s undertaking of the current study. The researcher 
firstly intends to critically explore and examine the levels of human rights violations that take place in the 
context of civil conflicts (Darfur region). The researcher further attempts to investigate on which party 
between the Government of Sudan and the two major rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army 
(SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) could be blamed for the torture, mass killings, 
sexual abuse on women and children as well as displacements of civilians in the region. The researcher was 
also motivated by the desire to investigate the participation of the international community in protecting the 
vulnerable civilian population from violence perpetrated by parties in the civil conflict under study. Can the 
intervention by the international community (China and the U.S.A.) be pressumed as a responsibility to 
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protect civilians or it could have been a result of some vested national interests within the government of 
Sudan? 
 
The researcher hopes to establish that the government forces in cahoots with the Janjaweed militia were the 
ones who violated the civilian rights more than the rebel groups. This presumption is premised on the 
countless occasions in which the Sudanese armed forces participated in the contravention of the International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Laws in the Darfur region during the course of the civil war. 
 
 In the intervention of the civil conflict, the researcher also hopes to observe that some international actors 
had their vested political, economic and security interests in Sudan that such interventions were only meant 
to protect those interests. Both the Chinese and the United States of American governments have shown 
military, economic and political interests in Sudan and these are the basis these governments could have 
participated in the conflict.  
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
The Darfur conflict which started in February 2003 between the Sudanese government forces and two major 
rebel groups , the (JEM and SLM/A) ignited one of the worst humanitarian crisis in modern history. The 
government of Sudan in the main has been roundly accused of committing acts of torture, rape, killings and 
looting of civilian property with thousands of refugees fleeing into neighbouring Chad while others were 
internally displaced (Doha Document for Peace in Darfur 2011:48). The allegations on the Sudanese 
government abusing its authority on ordinary civilians did not only end on these human rights violations. It 
also came to the international attention that humanitarian agencies that intended to assist those vulnerable 
civilians were refused entry into the Darfur region. This was on suspicion that they were spies from the 
imperialist Western governments intending to effect regime change in the country (Amnesty Internation 
2016).  
 
In the context of the extensive violations of the international humanitarian and human rights laws by the 
Sudanese government towards the civilians and rights group campaigners, it is relevant to explore the ways 
in which the international community intervened to protect the rights of civilians. 
 
1.4 Proposition  
The intervention by the international community on the Darfur conflict came a bit too late when the 
government of Sudan had already committed genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
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1.5 Research Problem and Objectives: Key Questions Asked 
Using the 2003 Darfur crisis as the research’s point of focus, the aim of this study is to explore the role that 
the international community played in order to extricate the civilians from human rights abuses in the hands 
of the Sudanese regime. In the context of this study, the researcher will be focusing on the following 
objectives: 
 
• To establish how the Darfur conflict started; 
• Establishing how the international community played its role in protecting civilians and ending the 
conflict; and 
• Propose recommendations on resolving the conflict 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
The research is intended to answer the following questions: 
• What were the short and long term causes of the 2003 Darfur civil war? 
• What were the parties that constituted the civil war and how did they abuse the rights of civilian 
population? 
• In what ways did the international community contribute in protecting the rights of civilians and 
resolving the conflict? 
 
 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.7.1 Description of Research Methodology 
 Qualitative Method Defined 
Qualitative research is basically an exploratory form of research, which has been for a long time used to 
acquire knowledge of the underlying motivations, reasons and opinions on the research problem (DeFranzo, 
2011). A qualitative research method helps the researcher to have a deeper understanding and insight of the 
research problem, and further uncovers opinions and trends in thought in order to deeply scrutinize the 
problem under study. 
 
(i) Advantages 
The research is a combination of historical and qualitative approaches where serious violations of 
international humanitarian and international human rights laws were carried out by both government forces 
and rebel groups in Darfour are unpacked. This is a qualitative research where both primary and secondary 
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data analysis is conducted to come up with results that will be used for the research recommendations and 
possible solutions to the problem(s) at hand (Mayring 2000). This is more particulary a desktop review of 
literature from relevant texts, scholarly articles, the UN Charter, UNSC resolutions, AU reports on Darfur, 
and the AU’s Constitutive Act. The case study on the Darfur conflict within a prescribed time-frame is more 
appropriate for the researcher as it provides an in-depth study of the problem at hand (Bell 1995). This 
research is conducted on the events that occurred between 2003 up to 2016. 
 
Information is also sourced from peer-reviewed journal articles, government (reports, press releases), 
speeches from government officials, regional and international representatives, online articles, published and 
unpublished theses and dissertations. Since the research will be basically desktop study, the researcher will 
be confined to information already at hand and the limitations associated with personal interviews and 
questionnaires are avoided. This also minimizes issues to do with ethical considerations which are of 
paramount importance where respondents’ confidentiality and privacy are not violated (Saldana 2009). 
 
The desktop research has been preferred for a number of reasons, chief amongst them being the geographical 
location of the research area. With the limited financial and material resources at hand, the researcher could 
not be able to travel to Sudan. This problem has also been compounded by the restrictions of access by the 
GoS to the conflict ridden Darfur region. “The government of Sudan does not permit any national or 
international human rights investigators, journalists, or humanitarian actors to operate inside the areas of 
Jebel Marra…” (Amnesty International 2016:7). Qualitative desktop research in this context is more ideal 
and advantageous as the researcher makes do with the already available data to come up with a consolidated 
research project. 
 
The area of Jebel Mara is one of the regions in Darfur which the Amnesty International confirmed 
experienced the human rights violations in the history of the Darfur conflict. In an effort to conceal the 
civilian human rights violations the GoS forces restricted access of the areas to any humanitarian staffers 
and researchers.  The problem of field research would also have been compounded by the serious risk of 
soliciting information from the victims of rights abuses in the conflict ridden area as they will be afraid of 
repraisals from the perpetrators. 
 
Both international and local human rights organisations carried out extensive research and published 
consolidated reports that the researcher would make use of. The researcher would further extract valuable 
information from various reports of the United Nations Security Council Commission of Inquiries conducted 
in the Darfur. The 2004 International Commission of Inquiry is one that report which came up with 
recommendations of referring the the perpetrators of violence both in the GoS and rebel groups to the 
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International Criminal Court. The researcher would in the same context solicit information from various 
reports of the Office of the Public Prosecutor in the ICC. 
   
1.8 Background 
Sudan is the largest country in the African continent and it covers an estimated geographical area of 2.5 
million square kilometres. It is bordered by the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kenya in the South; 
Chad, Libya and the Central African Republic in the West; Egypt in the North and Ethiopia and Eritrea in 
the East. The country has an estimated population of 39 million, with rural dwellers constituting 68%, urban 
population 32% while about 7% is the nomadic constituency. The Black African ethnic group constitutes an 
estimated fifty-two percent of the total Sudanese population while the Arab African ethnic group is 
constituted by approximately thirty nine percent of the country’s population (Tanagho & Hermina 
2009:371).  
 
There are more than 130 languages and dialects in Sudan but Arabic is the widely spoken language in the 
country. The country is considered a Least Developed Country and is ranked number 139 on the Human 
Development Index (United Nations Development Programme 2004). Like many other African countries, 
Sudan’s infrastructure such as the road network is not well developed while commercial agriculture and 
natural resources exploitation has recently become established in the country more particularly after the 
discovery of oil reserves in the central and southern parts of the country. 
 
Soon after attaining independence from the British-Egyptian rule in 1956, Western, Southern, and Nothern 
Sudan merged together to make a democratic new dispensation. However the democratically elected 
government did not last for more than two years before it was overthrown in a military coup d’ etat. The 
country tried to restore another democratic rule, but was eventually militarily overthrown between 1965 and 
1969, with another military coup taking over from 1985 to 1989. This resulted in the current President Omar 
al-Bashir being installed by the military and promised citizens that he would bring peace to the troubled 
country (Sudane Tribune: 2003). The coming into power of Omar al-Bashir resulted in many Sudanese being 
either imprisoned or forced into exiled and all political organisations banned (Kothari 2010 : 210) 
 
 1.8.1 The Darfur region 
The Darfur region is situated in the western Sudan and has since 1994 been partitioned into three 
administrative states of South, North and West Darfur. The region covers a geographical area of 250 000 
square kilometres with an estimated population of more than 6 million people (Amnesty International 
2016:10). The province is constituted by both the African and Arab people with the Muslim population 
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accounting for the majority inhabitants (Sidahmed et al.: 2010). The three administrative states are each 
governed by a Governor appointed by the Khartoum central government.  
 
The economic activities in the Darfur states are based on some subsistence farming together with cattle 
herding. There are numerous tribes in the region, amongst them are agriculturalists which include the Fur 
and the Tama while the sedentary cattle herders are constituted by the southern Rhezeghat and the Zaghawa. 
The life expectancy is at about fifty years, with the annual population growth rate tagged at two percent (CIA 
The World Fact Book: 2009). 
 
The land issue in the region has for the past been the heart of political discontent and its ownership was 
traditionally communal. The tribal leadership took control of land appropriation to the population for 
agricultural, dwelling and pastoral purposes. However, during the 1970s, the government changed the land 
laws to make individual land ownership through the state. The change of land ownership to the state made 
it easier for government officials to apportion pieces of land to individuals on the basis of their loyalty to the 
government, (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005:21).  
 
Communities in Darfur practice the shadoufing, a simple irrigation system where water is channelled to the 
farms through terracing and concentration of runoff water in which crops such as millet, sorghum, citrus, 
onions, chillies and okra are cultivated by the Fur, Berti and the Masalit tribes (Manger 2006:5). The northern 
Darfur is an occupation of the pastoralist Zagahwa and Meidod tribes whose livelihood is dependent on the 
rearing of camels, goats and sheep, while in the south the Baggara, Rizeigat, Habbaniya and Beni Halba are 
more preoccupied with cattle ranching. 
 
The history of Darfur’s tribal rivalry is best explained by the region’s proximity to the Great Sahara region 
where the effects of desertification resulted in huge pieces of both agricultural and pastoral land becoming 
increasingly arid and unsuitable for farming. Tension between tribes particularly in the Jebel Marrah plateau 
was a result of cattle herders in search of water and pastures invading the land of agriculturalist and in the 
end caused bloody conflicts (ICID, 2005).  
 
It is also important to highlight that the effects of desertification and drought did not only affect the Darfur 
region, but the entire Sahara region. This in effect resulted in the migration of nomads from as far as Libya 
and the Chad into Darfur. Because the Darfur region was considered to be relatively fertile, and as the infux 
of immigrants continued, the land increasingly became scarce, tensions escalated between the immigrants 
and the Darfurians (Jerome Tubiana 2911:12). 
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The conflict between tribes in Darfur became difficult to contain as some Darfurians were accessing weapons 
and arms from the neighbouring Chad and Libya as well as South of Sudan. This became increasingly more 
easier for the villagers to formally organise themselves into military groups in the hope of defending their 
territories. In the late 1980s, the clashes were more pronounced between the Fur tribes who had later created 
a group called the African Belt and the Arabic nomadic tribes who also had created their alliance named the 
Arabic Gathering (ICID, 2005:22). The government intervened in some of the clashes that erupted between 
the tribes but the Darfurians felt that there was little the government was doing to address the fundamental 
problems faced by the people of Darfur. The differences between the ‘African’ and ‘Arab’ tribes was indeed 
a result of the competing social and economic interest, deliberate marginalizations as well as the politically 
polarized atmosphere that had existed in the region. 
 
 
1.9 Organization of  the Study 
The dissertation is constituted by four chapters. The first chapter is the introduction of the research and also 
gives the broader origin of the conflict. It is the first chapter that examines the problem statement, defines 
the researcher’s proposition of the problem at hand as well as the research objectives and questions. This 
chapter is concluded by the methodology used to collect data.  
 
Chapter two reviews the literature on how the international community contributed to the protection of 
civilian rights in the conflict. The international community under review will be constituted by the United 
Nations Security Council, the African Union, the South African Government, the government of United 
Staes of America, the European Union, the Chinese government, the International Criminal Court and the 
constituency of non-state actors. The theoretical framework is also discussed in the second chapter. 
 
The third chapter covers the scope, nature of the conflict as well as the extent of gross human rights violations 
during the period of conflict. The research is concluded by chapter four which covers the study findings, 
conclusion and the recommendations suggested. 
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2  CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The International Community’s Intervention 
The outbreak of violence in the Darfur region in 2003 coincided with the Rwandan genocide’s tenth 
anniversary. This ultimately prompted human rights activists to see this conflict as a litmus test for the 
international community’s response and readiness to give protection to civilians under threat from conflicting 
parties. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on the 7th of April 2004 on his memorial address for the 
Rwandan genocide in Geneva gave an account of how the international community had to engage the parties 
to the Darfurian crisis. He further potrayed that the ethnic cleansing that was taking shape in the Darfur 
region was taking tall and emphasised that the international community should not stand aside while human 
rights violations of such magnitude unfolded (Slim 2004:811).  
 
In the context of the Secretary General’s concerns about the plight of the Darfurian population, a number of 
questions have to be answered regarding the role that was played by the international community to avert 
the imploding Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes and Genocide by the GoS armed forces. How did the 
international community respond to the Darfur crisis? Has there been any dicisive actions, or there was mere 
inaction as what occurred in the Rwanda genocide? If there was action taken on the crisis, was it timeously 
and effective to protect the vulnerable communities? 
 
In order to to fully establish the extend of the international community’s participation and intervention in the 
Darfur conflict, the researcher will identify the different constituencies of the global community. In this 
research the international community is comprised of the United Nations Security Council, the African 
Union, the South African government, the Chinese government, the European Union, the government of 
United States of America, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the various local and international 
humanitarian agencies as well as some influential independent states across the globe.  
 
(i) The Responsibilty to Protect: Intervention as a Duty of Care 
The principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is premised on the international community’s 
commitment and dedication to saving the lives of ordinary civilians. It further includes the clause in 
defending the human rights of innocent citizens who are at the mercy of undemocratic governments. The 
ascertion was highlighted by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his September 1999 General 
Assembly speech when he said, “If the collective conscience of humanity cannot be found in the United 
Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and for justice” 
(Annan, 2012:116). In this speech, the Secretary General intended to bring to light how the international 
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community, in the UN could contribute in intervening in the protection of civilian population from wholesale 
slaughter by governments which did not observe the rights of citizens.  
 
The government of Canada in September 2000, moved a step further by taking over the 1999 Kofi Annan’s 
UN General Assemby R2P campaign. The campaign by the Canadian government brought together 
distinguished scholars and diplomats who included the former Australian foreign affairs minister Gareth 
Evans together with Mohamed Sahnoun from the Algerian foreign ministry (Annan  2012:116). The 
objective was to draft a report for the implementation of the Annan’s new norm of international community 
interventionist approach that had to be reframed to the “responsibility to protect”. 
 
The principle of the R2P was a culmination partly of events that took place in conflicts involving the 1994 
Rwanda Genocide. During the 1994 conflict, there was an estimated 800 000 civilians killed by a government 
sponsored violence while the international community failed to protect. This failure to prevent or halt the 
Rwandan genocide was described by the UN secretary-general as a “sin of omission”, while the former 
British prime minister indicated that “if Rwanda happens again we would not walk away as the outside has 
done many times before”. The prime minister further stated that the international community has a moral 
obligation to provide military and humanitarian assistance to Africa whenever it is needed (Bellamy 2005: 
31). In the same context of the international society’s participation in the protection of civilians in conflict 
ridden countries, the American government labelled as “rogues” those states that brutalize their citizens in 
order to undemocratically cling to power while spluandering state resources. 
 
 
2.2   Responsibility to Protect the Darfurians: United Nations. 
The mounting evidence of massive human rights abuses in the Darfur region that started in the early 2003 
came as a litmus test for the capacity of the international community’s will to halt the ethnic cleansing by 
the GoS. In response to the crisis in the region, the UN and member states committed themselves to intervene 
by flurry of missions, humanitarian assistance and calls for negotiations. The United Nations further 
demanded that the GoS should act on the perpetrators of violence, threatening the imposition of sanctions to 
the government, putting in place a commission of inquiry as well as supporting the AU peacekeeping mission 
in the country (Clough 2005:1).  
 
However the commitment of the UNSC on the Darfur crisis came into question in late 2004 on the steps 
taken at a special session on Sudan in Nairobi, Kenya, to follow through the earlier commitments and 
resolutions on the crisis. This further showed that the suffering of the civilian population in the region would 
continue as had happened to the Rwandan people in the 1994 genocide.  
17 | P a g e  
 
 
It is important to note that the approach that the international community took, in particular the UN to protect 
civilians in Darfur was complicated by its involvement in the negotiations of the north-south civil conflict 
in Navasha, Kenya between the early 2003 and mid-2004 (Clough 2005:4). There was an overwhelming 
expectation and optimisim that such negotiations would immediately bring a lasting solution to the crisis in 
the north-south conflict but there was evidence of serious violence and human rights abuses taking place. 
The Security Council in the meantime tried to take the Darfur crisis off the agenda during the north-south 
negotiations fearing that the Khartoum government would completely pull out of the Naivasha talks (Slim 
2004:822). This is evidenced by the failure by the SC to even mention the Darfur conflict in June 2004 when 
member states met to pass Resolution 1547. The resolution that came out of  that meeting went on to establish 
a UN mission in Sudan in preparation for monitoring the final agreement between the GoS and the SPLM/A  
(Cloughh 2005:4). 
 
The UN’s role in the Darfur crisis was more diplomatic intervention than military, where both parties were 
urged to settle their differences through negotiations. It was also the responsibility of the UN to participate 
in the passing of resolutions by the SC to address pertinent issues to do with violations of human rights 
during the conflict. There are a number of resolutions passed by the SC as a way of intervening in the conflict 
to give pressure to the Khartoum government and its allies to end the gross civilian rights violations.  
 
In 2004, after repeated appeals from both humanitarian and human rights activists as well as visits by the 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in Darfur together with representatives from the United States of America 
and Europe, the UNSC was convinced that the GoS and its Janjaweed militia were indeed participating in 
the gross violations of civilian rights ( International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur:2005)  
 
The concern of the international community, UNSC in particular was that the GoS had indeed failed to carry 
out its constitutional duty to protect ordinary civilians and that the international community’s intervention 
was warranted (Bellamy & Williams 2006:150). This resulted in the SC passing Resolution number 1556 
which required the GoS to dissociate itself from the Janjaweed militia, disarm them and bring those leaders 
who incited violence against civilians to the country’s judiciary system. The resolution imposed a thirty-day 
deadline for the government to comply, failure to which the Security Council would impose economic, 
political and military sanctions. The government of the United States of America further threatened to 
unilaterally impose its own arms embargo and travel bans on Sudanese government officials. 
 
 Although China and Pakistan abstained on the passing of Resolution 1556, the resolution was approved by 
a 13-0 vote. This in the end prompted the SC to further approve the deployment of an AU mission that would 
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monitor the ceasefire agreement between the rebel groups and the GoS. Some council members such as 
Pakistan were opposed to the imposition of sanctions in principle against the Sudanese government, citing 
the violation of the principle of sovereignity on the party of Sudan, while the Arab League issued a similar 
statement to oppose sanctions in principle (Khan & Addellah 2004). 
 
The UN’s concern of the unfolding events in the Darfur region was highlighted in the early 2004, when 
Mukesh Kapila, the UN’s coordinator for Sudan clearly blamed the GoS for backing the Arab aligned militia 
to conducting an “ethnic cleansing” exercise in the region. Kapila went on to warn that if that remained 
unchecked, the humanitarian catastrophe would be comparable to the 1994 Rwanda genocide (BBC 2004a). 
In the same context, the Secretary General Kofi Annan was equally worried that the events in the region left 
him with, ‘a deep sense of foreboding’, and that the international community had to swiftly intervene before 
the region degenerated into another Rwanda.  
 
With the above mentioned concerns of a humanitarian crisis in the Darfur, the UN Commission on Human 
Rights in April 2004 sent a mission to the region to ascertain the claims of human rights violations by the 
government armed forces with the Janjaweed militia. The mission’s investigation came up with ‘a disturbing 
pattern of disregard for basic principles of human rights and humanitarian law’ (UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights 2005:3). The team in the end concluded that the GoS and its proxies were responsible for the 
widespread violations. However, some officers in the commission leaked the draft report  to the press before 
the Commission could vote on a resolution based on the draft report (Bellamy & Williams 2006:149)  
 
Having noticed that the conflict in the Darfur region was escalating with no solution from both parties being 
anticipated in the near future and that the situation would constitute a threat to international peace and 
security, the UNSC in March 2005 at its 5158th meeting adopted Resolution 1593. This resolution was passed 
when the Security Council was acting under Chapter V11 of the UN Charter. In essence, the resolution was 
meant to refer the Darfur crisis to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) wherein the GoS 
and all the other parties to the conflict were obliged to fully participate and cooperate with the Court and the 
Prosecutor (Resolution 1595 2005:1).  
 
In addition to the referral of the crisis to the Prosecutor, the resolution further provides for other states and 
or international organisations to cooperate fully with the Rome Statute in the best interest of the affected 
Darfurian population worst affected by the conflict. The SC through Resolution 1595 also proposed that the 
ICC and the AU should provide for practical arrangements that would facilitate the work of the Prosecutor 
to conduct his/her work in the African region in the best interest of the continent to eradicate impunity. The 
Court was also encouraged within the Rome Statute framework, to support international cooperation with 
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local cause in the promotion of the rule of law, combating impunity in Darfur as well as protecting the rights 
of civilians. 
 
In the best interest of the Darfurian population, the promotion of international peace and security and 
supporting the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, the UN Security Council 
met on the 31st of July 2007 for its 5727th meeting where Resolution 1769 was passed (Resolution 1769 
2007:3). Through this resolution, the Security Council resolved to establish for the initial 12 months of an 
African Union-United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID).  
 
The established mission consisted of 19 555 military personnel, that included 360 military observers, 3 772 
police personnel which also included an appropriate civilian percentage. This mission was to be under the 
command of the AU-UN Joint Special Representative for Darfur Rodolphe Adada and Force Commander 
Martin Agwai. The UNAMID was mandated to first and foremost protect its personnel on the ground, its 
facilities, installations and equipment to be used in the operation, freedom of movement for its personnel 
and humanitarian aid staffers.  
 
It is also important to note that Resolution 1769  called upon all parties involved in the Darfur conflict to 
immediately halt any further hostilities against each other and the civilians and confine themselves to 
permanent cease-fire. Parties were also directed to immediately cease any attacks on AMIS, civilians and 
humanitarian agencies, their staff and assets and relief convoys in the region (Akuffo 2010:81). On the 
conduct of the UNAMID personnel on the ground, the resolution stressed the need for UN forces to be in 
line with the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse of vulnerable civilians who look 
upon them for protection. In order for such standards to be upheld, the Security Council proposed to provide 
for the enhancement of regular training for personnel in order to prevent cases of misconduct and that all 
members are in full compliance with the UN code of conduct as well as the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse ( UNSC Resolution 1769 2007:5). 
 
The UN operations in the Darfur region was faced with a number of challenges ranging from inadequate 
resources, logistical factors, attacks from both the government and the rebel forces.The UN forces were 
further faced with restrictive measures put by the GoS on how the mission should operate(UN Security 
Council Report 2016:16). The March 2016 Security Council report by the Secretary General which was 
submitted in pursuant of Resolution 2228 (2015) in which the SC mandated the UNAMID to extend their 
stay in Darfur to the 30th of June 2016 highlighted some of the challenges that were encountered by the 
mission during the period under review.  
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Although there was a marked reduction in incidents of criminal attacks on the UNAMID properties and 
personnel during the reviewed period isolated cases of criminal attacks on UN staff were not uncommon. 
During this period, a total of 14 criminal incidents which included 18 break-ins, burglary and theft, 2 
robberies of national staff, 1 attempted robbery, 4 attacks on UNAMID convoys, 2 carjacking incidents, 1 
assault of a UNAMID national staff member, 14 incidents of stone throwing were reported (UNSC Report 
2016:8/19). 
 
The restrictive land movements and planned flights on both UNAMID and humanitarian organisations took 
place mostly in the Northern Darfur. This in turn resulted in civilians being vulnerable to both government 
and rebel forces. As a result of such complications there was an increased pattern of inhibition on reporting 
by civilians of human rights violations which mainly included sexual and gender-based abuses to either the 
UNAMID or other humanitarian organisations. In the Jebel Mara attacks, the UNAMID mission could not 
be able to therefore provide civilian protection, unless the civilians themselves managed to get to the 
UNAMID base which was located in Sortoni (Amnesty International 2016).  
 
International humanitarian organizations and peacekeepers were further prohibited from accessing the 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) by both the government forces and rebel groups. Between December 
2014 and March 2015, there were 63 movement restrictions on the UNAMID mission, with 59 being imposed 
by the GoS, while three were imposed by the SLA/AW and one by the Liberation and Justice Movement 
(US Department of State Reports on Human Rights Practices 2015:31). The report further indicated that 
between March and October 2015, 37 restrictions were imposed on the UNAMID mission, while 68 of the 
2 189 planned flights were refused clearance by the government between March and June 2015.  
 
Most of the operational challenges faced by the UNAMID were directly related to the security uncertainties 
posed by the government forces and the rebel groups in most parts of the Darfur region. Since the basic 
mandate of the UNAMID was for the protection of civilian population, it was mandatory that they had to 
timeously be allowed to access all areas where civilians lived. The efforts by the mission to access restricted 
places by the government exposed them to regular attacks and ambushes carried out sometimes by 
unidentified armed groups (United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights Report 2015:6). The report 
further indicated that in 2014 alone, 5 UNAMID peacekeepers lost their lives in the hands of unidentified 
armed people. On the 10th of April 2014, the report further furnishes that UNAMID police advisers in El 
Fasher were raped and robbed. This raping and robbing in the end resulted in the limited movements and 
monitoring by the peacekeepers and drastically affected the civilian protection. 
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It is also important to note that the responsibility of the UNAMID in pursuant to upholding the Doha 
Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) arrangement was to monitor human rights violations from both the 
government forces as well as the rebel groups. In the context of monitoring rights violations, the major 
challenges faced by the mission included the gathering of vital information from government authorities as 
well as the reluctance by the victims to share information of their abuse by the armed forces both government 
and rebels (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Report 2015:5). 
 
2.3 The African Union 
The AU as part of the international community, in terms of article 5(2) of its Constitutive Act, established 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC), a security organ of the organisation in May 2004. This was done in 
order to replace the Central Organ of the OAU to provide for the management, prevention and conflict 
resolutions in the continent. The PSC in its operation is supported by the African Peace and Security 
Architecture [APCA] (article 2(2)). The APC is constituted by the Panel of the Wise(PW), Continental Early 
Warning System (CEWS), the AU Commission, African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund (PF).  
 
Article 5(d) and (g) of the Constitutive Act provides that all PSC member states should demonstrate a 
willingness and desire to participate in all forms of conflict resolutions, peacemaking and peacebuilding at 
both regional and sub-regional levels. It is through these expectations that the AU requires member states to 
be identified by the norms of good governance, rule of law as well as the respect of human rights (Akuffo 
2010:77). 
 
The post- colonial state-building in the African continent came with it a number of civil conflicts which 
degenerated into violence and escalated into some environments of anarchy. This in turn provided the 
propitious conditions of rampant human rights violations on the part of the civilian population by the 
government forces and the militia allies (Kieh, Jr 2013:43).  
 
The history of the African Union as a regional institution has been characterized by cases of war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity. These crimes were in one way or another committed by both the 
rebel groups as well as the government forces in civil conflicts across the African continent. The violations 
included the terrorization of innocent civilians, violations of personal diginity, mass killings as well as sexual 
violence against women with perpetrators surviving with impunity. Such crimes were reported during the 
civil wars in Uganda (1986-2010), the two civil wars in Liberia (1989-1997 and 1999-2003), the Sierra 
Leonean war (1991-2002) and the Congo war (1997-1999, 1999-2003 and 2003-2006) (Kieh Jr 2013:43).  
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However the civil war that exposed the ineffectiveness of the Organisation of African Unity in dealing with 
peace and security in the continent was the 1990-1994 Rwandan Genocide. This war  left  more than 800 000 
civilian population dead at the mercy of government forces and the Interhamwe militia. The continental body 
observed the Rwandan atrocities from the sidelines without intervening in protecting the civilians The 
argument brought forward by the OAU was that it was preserving and propagating the principles of non-
interferrence and respecting the sovereignty of member states. The international community in this instance 
failed the people of Rwanda by not making a humanitarian intervention on a state that had failed to give 
protection to its citizens (Evans & Sahnoun 99:2002). 
 
The principle of state sovereignty has failed the African civilian population at the mercy of the OAU and 
other regional organisations. This principle in essence gave preference to non-intervention, territorial 
integrity and state sovereignty at the expense of the observance of human rights in conflict situations where 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide were being committed with impunity (Kabau 2012: 49-
52). The principle of state sovereignity has in the end resulted in the failure by the international community 
to intervene in conflict ridden states. In the end such a traditional conceptualization ultimately became 
effectively a shield by states which deliberately violated international humanitarian laws in protecting 
civilians within their domestic relms. 
 
The African Union, the successor to the moribund OAU in 2002 came up with a change to the 
conceptualization of the principle of state sovereignty in the African continent in which it included the 
responsibility to protect clause. By the responsibility to protect by member states, the AU implied that while 
states retained their sovereign status, they had a responsibility to protect their citizens from heinous acts that 
included war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (Peace and Security Council 2004). The clause 
further provides that in the event that a member state fails to perform its responsibility to protect, the AU 
would assert its legal right to circumscribe the sovereignty of such a member state (Kieh Jr 45:2013). 
 
It has to be emphasised that the AU’s interventionist duty is premised in both the Pan-Africanism and the 
principle of non-indeference ideals (Akuffo 2010:77). The inference is provided for by Articles 4(h) and 4(j) 
of the AU’s Constitutive Act which stipulates that the continental body has the right to intervene, ‘in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assemby in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity.’ The Act further stipulates that intervention can be warranted in cases 
of serious threat to legitimate order, and the intervention will be done to restore peace and stability to the 
concerned member state. This however can only be done once the Peace and Security Council would have 
recommended such action and that the Member State would have formally requested intervention from the 
African Union (Akuffo :2010)   
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  (a)   African Union Mission in Sudan (Darfur) 
It is the PSC that was instrumental in the authorisation of the first peacekeeping mission since its inception, 
the   African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to monitor the N’djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement 
(HCFA) between the GoS  forces and the two main rebel groups JEM and the SPLM/A in Darfur (Akuffo 
2010:75). Following the signing of the agreement, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the 
AU approved the AMIS mission in May 2004 to control the worsening humanitarian catastrophe and 
monitoring the agreement (Mensah 2005:7). These peacekeeping forces that were deployed in the region 
played an important role in protecting civilians from abuse by both the government forces and the rebel 
groups. The AU”s main aim was to avoid the repeat of the 1994 genocide which  claimed the lives of more 
than 800 000 innocent civilians within a period of 100 days in the Rwandan conflict. 
 
Article 3 of the HCFA provided for the establishment of the Ceasefire Commission(CFC) which consisted 
of high ranking officials from the GoS and the two main rebel groupings, together with the Chadian 
mediation team and the international community officials. In Article 4, the AU authorises and mandates the 
CFC to monitor, verify, investigate and report on violations of the terms of the agreement (Appiah-Mensah 
2005:8). The AU deployed 60 military officers for monitoring the agreement while 300 protection forces 
were deployed to provide security for the unarmed observers in the region.  
 
However because of the severity of the humanitarian challenges in the Darfur region, it became evident that 
the number of both the military observers and the protection forces was far short a number to render the 
services they were made to provide. This resulted in the AU’s PSC on the 20th of October 2004 to authorise 
the enhancement of 3 320-strong  AMIS 11 forces. The forces included 2 341 military personnel, 450 
MILOBS, 815 civilian police (CIVPOL) and 26 international civilian staff members (Appiah-Mensah 
2005:9). This however did not alleviate the challenges of deploying the required personnel as issues of 
appropriate accommodation in the field, logistical arrangements, reluctance by troop-contributing countries 
(TCCs) and a bureaucratic stagnation at the AU headquarters remained unresolved during the process of 
deployment. 
 
 
(b) Intervention Through Mediation and Negotiations 
The AU in response to the UN’s reluctance to take immediate action on the Darfur conflict was to assert its 
authority and legitimacy through the PSC in resolving African conflicts without foreign, in particular the 
Western involvement. It was also an ideal opportunity for the AU to enforce its principle of non-indiference 
to violence within and amongst African member states (Akuffo 2010:80). This was an argument propagated 
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by the majority of African heads of state, with former South African president Thabo Mbeki stressing that 
African problems can only be best resolved by Africans. In the context of African leaders opting to resolve 
the continental conflicts from within, the first response by the AU to the Darfur conflict was the appointment 
of a Chadian mediation team that was headed by President Idriss Deby in an effort to politically settle the 
conflict. 
 
The preliminary stages of the negotiations encountered challenges and complications that emanated from the 
strained relationship between Chad and Sudan. This in the end resulted in the AU being tasked to be the sole 
mediator in the 7th round of the talks (Lanz n.d.:80). The other complication also came from the part of the 
rebels who exhibited signs of inexperience in negotiations as well as rifts between themselves (Williams & 
Bellamy 2005:30). Although challenges were preliminarily faced during the negotiations, the N’djamena 
Humanitarian Agreement was poised for its finality.  
 
The signed agreement had a number of discrepancies, chief amongst them included the fact that the document 
had been poorly drafted and a number of inconsistences on the English and Arabic versions (International 
Crisis Group 2004:4-7). Although challenges were part of the negotiations, the process finally culminated in 
the signing of the N’djamena Humanitarian Agreement on the 8th of April 2004. This signed agreement 
provided for the GoS, the SPLA/M and the JEM to cease hostilities and make a ceasefire proclamation for a 
period of 45 days (Akuffo 2010:80).  
 
The agreement also provided for its renewal upon the expiration of the initial 45 days unless one of the three 
parties opposed it. The establishment of a joint and ceasefire commission in which the international 
community would participate, including the AU was another product of the agreement (Lanz n.d:78). It is 
also important to note that the N’djamena agreement provided for the release of all prisoners of war and 
other detainees associated with the Darfur conflict, and that there should be an uninterrupted delivery of 
humanitarian assistance to the affected civilians in the region. 
 
The N’Djamena agreement failed to bring about the much anticipated end to the conflict between the GoS 
and the two major rebel groups. This was directly a result of the parties’ failure to honour the provisions of 
the agreement. This in turn resulted in the commencement of the Inter-Sudanese Talks on Darfur in July 
2004 which took place in Abuja, Nigeria (Lanz n.d:78). The parties to the Abuja negotiations were the GoS, 
the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The broader 
objectives of the Abuja talks were to resolve issues of power sharing, wealth sharing, a comprehensive 
ceasefire, security arrangements and the Darfur-Darfur dialogue and consultation (Mansaray 2009:43). 
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However, through an extensive engagement of the parties the agreement was only signed by the GoS and 
one faction of the rebel groups, the SLA led by Minni Manawi on the 5th of May 2006.  
 
These talks were held in Abuja, Nigeria (Abuja Negotiations) and were co-mediated by Chad and the AU 
until May 2006. Although the Abuja negotiations were an African project which intended to resolve an 
African problem, and being led by a respected African statesman who represented a regional organization, 
the international community also played a critical and dynamic role in how the mediation process had to 
move foward. For example the international community became so impatient on the slow pace at which the 
process of the negotiations was going, and as the financial backers of the negotiations it gave the end of 2005 
as the cut-off date of the talks (Lanz n.d:80). 
 
The South African Government 
The South African government foreign policy attracted criticism from both the western governments and 
international human rights defenders such as the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the 
International Red Cross (Human Rights Watch:2008). South Africa as a member of the UN Security Council 
and the UN Human Right Council was accused of attempting to shield the censure of those governments that 
contravened International Humanitarian Laws as well as violating the basic human rights of civilians 
(Nathan:2008).  
 
With regards to the crisis in the Darfur region, the South African government under the Presidency of Thabo 
Mbeki was alleged to have turned a blind eye on the human rights abuses on ordinary civilians by the 
Khartoum administration. The international community was baffled by Pretoria’s inconsistence regarding 
its foreign policy more particularly on its handling of rights violations in Darfur. This was more pronounced 
specifically considering its historical background of fighting against minority oppression in order to embrace 
human rights and constitutional governance. In the United Nations Security Council, South Africa defended 
the Sudanese government when the Human Rights Council made efforts to address the Darfur crisis. This 
was evidenced by Pretoria’s opposition to a resolution by the Security Council in 2006 that intended to 
compel Khartoum to take firm steps that would guarantee the protection of civilians in the Darfur (van 
Nieuwkerk :2007). 
 
The insistence by the South African government to side with the Sudanese government was further exposed 
in 2007 when Pretoria was elected into the Security Council. A resolution that was tabled in the Security 
Council which could have led to the sanctioning of the militias attacking civilians, and refusing to co-operate 
with the UNAMID was fiercely resisted by Pretoria (United Nations Office Press Release: 2006).  
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In the General Assembly (GA), a resolution tabled to condemn the use of rape as a political and military tool 
by the Khartoum forces was resisted by Pretoria in 2007. The South African government argued that the 
United States of American government had deliberately tabled the resolution to target the Sudanese 
government (Department of foreign Affairs:2007). Former President Thabo Mbeki in his capacity as the 
mediator in the Darfur conflict was blamed for his continued condemnation of the rebel forces in the best 
part of his mediation. In direct contrast, President Mbeki  hailed President al-Bashir’s administration despite 
clear evidence of ethnic cleansing, atrocities and abuse of civilians.  
 
The abuse of power by the Sudanese government also came to light during the 2005 United Nations 
sanctioned International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur. The inquiry revealed that the government forces 
in alliance with the Janjaweed militia were directly responsible for the “indiscriminate attacks, torture, 
enforced disappearances, destruction of villages and other forms of sexual abuses on women and children” 
(International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur :2005). Despite these revelations, President Mbeki issued a 
statement that opposed the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment on President Omar al Bashir, 
insisting that this would threaten lasting peace and reconciliation in Sudan(Sudanese Media Centre:2008). 
 
The government of South Africa endured further criticism on its reluctance to take seriously the human rights 
violations perpetrated by the Sudanese armed forces on the Darfurian civilian population. The attention 
attached to the 2004 Naivasha ceasefire accord by President Mbeki, Deputy President Jacob Zuma’s 
attendance of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and thereafter President Mbeki witnessed 
the inauguration of the Government of National Unity in Khartoum during the time thousands of Darfurians 
were being tortured by the same Sudanese government. Pretoria was in this context roundly condemned for 
prioritizing the North-South conflict where the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) was again accused of 
not honouring the terms of the CPA (International Crisis Group:2006). 
 
The events that took place in the North-South clearly reflected that the South African government took 
seriously the Khartoum crisis at the expense of the developments that had already claimed thousands of lives 
since February 2003 in Darfur. One of the senior Pretoria cabinet ministers Ronnie Kasril (Intelligence) in 
2006 while delivering a speech on the international support for Sudan peacebuilding failed to highlight 
events unfolding in the Darfur region. Much of the speech was exclusively revolving around the negotiations 
that led to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Kasril:2006). This in essence justified the 
call by the international community to persuade Pretoria to take a hard stance on Khartoum as a result of the 
evident contraventions of both the International Humanitarian and Human Rights Laws in the Darfur. 
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However, dispite all the concerns by both the non-state actors and the Western governments on South 
Africa’s reluctance to denounce the Khartoum administration, Pretoria remained consistent with its 
Africanist agenda and engagements in continental peacemaking (Nathan:2007). In the context of South 
Africa’s engagement with the government of Sudan, it has apparently been emphasized that Pretoria’s 
foreign policy has been premised on both its principled solidarity with African regimes as well as its anti-
imperialist international narrative.  
 
This perspective by the South African government has undergone numerous scrutiny from both local and 
international human rights defenders which translated this as an overlap on human rights considerations 
(Human Rights Watch:2007). Some further suggested that the government of South Africa was more 
interested in preserving its national economic interest than upholding the international human rights laws 
and norms. 
 
One of the factors that the South African government took into consideration on its alignment with the 
Khartoum administration was the foreign policy’s investment in the political and economic revitalisation of 
the African continent. This vision by President Mbeki was premised on the strategic programme of the New 
Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad)(Mbeki:2001). The essence of Nepad, according to 
President Mbeki was that the entire African continent can only recover from economic and political slumber 
through sustained development, economic growth and investment, (all these would require good governance, 
peace and stability). In this context, President Mbeki argued that the Darfur conflict if not diplomatically 
handled through mediations, engagements and dialogue, it would implode the country into anarchy and 
instability.  
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2.3.1  The United States of American Government 
 
                   Brief historical bilateral; relations between the two countries 
The American government played a pivotal role as part of the international community in finding ways that 
could end both the South Sudan and the Darfur conflicts. The relationship between the United States of 
America and Sudan can be traced back to the time when the former engaged the later during the North-South 
conflict. In 1993, the US categorized Sudan as a “state sponsor of terrorism” and imposed soft unilateral 
sanctions on Khartoum (Huliaras 2006:710).  
 
The relationship between the two countries was further strained in 1995 when Sudan declined to extradite 
three suspects to Ethiopia for an assassination attempt of the then president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak. The 
American government through the Clinton Presidency militarily assisted Eritria, Uganda and Ethiopia who 
intended to contain the rebels that were being sponsored by the Sudanese government.  
 
Although it might be argued that the US’s involvement in Sudan had much to do with the civil conflicts 
between the North and the South, as well as the Darfur  human rights violations, it has since been established 
that the US government had more to loose if the conflicts persisted than the welfare of the Sudanese people 
(Ravindran & Xiao’ou, 2012). This was clearly articulated by the then-Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, George Moose when he stressed that, the objective of U.S. foreign policy in the Horn of Africa was 
“clear and unequivocal: to isolate Sudan and to contain its support for insurgents and terrorists.” (Huliaras 
2006:710). 
 
The American government’s concern about Sudan being the haven for terrorists came into effect in early 
1996. This took place when its embassy was closed down for security reasons and the entire staff was 
relocated to Nairobi, Kenya. These concerns came about partly because of Osama bin Ladin who was said 
to have been in Sudan since 1991. The other concern also emanated from the fact that Sudan was a training 
hub for international terrorist groups that posed danger to both the ordinary American citizens as well as the 
diplomatic staff in the country (Lesch 2002:203-09).  
 
The U.S government in November 1997 further imposed comprehensive unilateral economic and financial 
sanctions to Khartoum through the blockade of all Sudanese assets in America. Washington’s restrictions of 
U.S companies from participating in any form of foreign direct investments in Sudan as well as barring of 
any financial transactions between the two countries was another notable form of pressure on the part of the 
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GoS (O’Sullivan 2003:242-5). These economic and financial sanctions were meant to pressurize the 
Sudanese government to dissociate itself from state terrorism.  
 
The bilateral relationship between the two countries was further strained in 1998 when the U.S. embassies 
in both Kenya and Tanzania were attacked by terrorists who were suspected of having originated from Sudan. 
In retaliation, the then U.S. President Bill Clinton ordered cruise-missile attacks on a Sudanese 
pharmaceutical company that was believed to having been producing precursors for the chemical weapons 
(Weiner & Risen:1998). However further investigations on the relationship between the pharmaceutical plant 
and the terrorism activity in Kenya and Tanzania was not substantiated. It aslo came to light that the 
information on how the decision to bomb the plant was said to have been fabricated as a result of poor 
intelligence gathering methods by the U.S. authorities (Croddy:2002). In the end it can clearly be inferred 
that without proper investigations as to who would have bombed the two embassies and where the precursors 
for chemical weapons were produced, the U.S. intelligence failed to gather the much needed information 
before attacking the pharmaceutical plant in Sudan (Bearden:1999).  
 
In the context of such frost relationships between the Khartoum administration and the U.S. government, it 
now remains to be seen if the intervention by the American government in both the North-South and the 
Darfur conflicts could be defined as being an objective resolve to end the humanitarian crisis in the country. 
 
                                      Darfur Crisis 
With regards to the Darfur conflict, the entire international community shared a portion of blame in the way 
it handled the early stages of the conflict.This was mainly because there is clear evidence of the reluctance 
to take clear cut and abrupt action once there was evidence of the Khartoum government being involved in 
the civilian rights violations in cahoots with the Janjaweed militia. The UN Security Council in particular 
only started holding deliberations on the Darfur crisis on the 7th of July 2004. This was soon after the return 
of the then United States of America (USA) State Secretary Colin Powell and UN Secrretary General Kofi 
Annan from the Sudan mission when the whole world had already learnt of the atrocities taking place in the 
Darfur region (Slim 2004).  
 
The visit by Colin Powell was a major international diplomatic breakthrough for the US government. This 
was mainly because it gave him an opportunity to make a personal assessment of the humanitarian challenges 
faced by the civilian population in the region at the mercy of the government of Sudan and come up with his 
conclusions. It is however important to note that the visit by the U.S. delegation of State Secretariat was 
partly because of mounting pressure from civic and advocacy groups such as the U.S. Holocaust Memorial 
Museum (USHMM), the American Jewish World Service as well as hundreds of evangelicals who were 
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already issuing a “genocide alert” in Darfur (Cooperman:2004). This resulted in the Congress adopting a 
resolution labelling the killings in Darfur by the Janjaweed militia with the government forces as “genocide”. 
 
The US government also made some funds available for a study to be carried out on the extent of ethnic 
killings in the Darfur region, and a survey was done in Chad where 1 136 Darfurian refugees were used as a 
sample. On being questioned, these refugees clearly stated that the violence against civilians was widespread, 
ethinically based and perpetrated by the government forces in cahoots with the Janjaweed militia (Straus 
2003:130). Based on the outcome of the study, Powell in September 2003 testified before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee where he again stressed the idea that indeed genocide was being carried out in the 
Darfur region. Barely two weeks after Powell’s testimony, the American president George W. Bush in his 
address to the Unided Nations General Assembly claimed that the Sudanese government was carrying out 
genocide to the civilians. 
 
Slim (2004:811-2) stated that the US government through Powell concluded that indeed genocide was 
commited in Darfur and that the government forces were at the centre of the systematic ethnic killings. It is 
important to note that the US government became the first and only Security Council member to pronounce 
and declare that the events unfolding in Darfur constituted genocide. Washington further stressed that the 
international community was duty bound to protect and make those responsible to account for their crimes 
(Clough n.d). 
  
When the US government later informed the United Nations Security Council about the genocidal atrocities 
in the Darfur region, the UNSC set up an International Commission of Inquiry (ICID) to examine and 
investigate those allegations (de Waal 2003:1042). The ICID report was released in February 2005 and in 
March the same year following the release of the report, the UNSC referred the case to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). The involvement of such international institutions like the UNSC and the ICC 
following the US’s pronouncement of the genocidal killings in the Darfur is proof to the international 
community that the US government had a considerable influence on how the conflict in the Darfur could be 
resolved. 
 
During the beginning of the conflict the Sudan government forces in cahoots with the Janjaweed militia were 
accused of human rights violations. When they physically attacked civilians and refuted the allegations, the 
US State Department, various other human rights groups and humanitarian organisations were at the 
forefront of condemning the Sudanese government’s actions. To substantiate its claims of government 
brutality on the civilian population, the US government went on to release statistics of deaths and injuries 
sustained by the victims as well as property damaged.  
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In addition to availing deaths statistics, the US State Department further highlighted that in late September 
2003, a total of 574 villages had been destroyed, while another 157 more were as well destroyed since mid-
2003 (Straus 2003:127).. With it’s advanced technology, the US government exposed the brutality of the 
Sudanese forces by shooting satellite pictures of the victims in the region and revealing the perpetrators who 
attacked civilians in their own villages where the rebels did not possess an armed presence (Slim 2004:824). 
The US government in taking the pictures of government forces brutalizing the civilians and destroying their 
villages and compounds, wanted the international community to physically notice the human rights 
violations that were being perpetrated by the government and that interventions were immediately warranted. 
 
(i) Pressure Through Economic Sanctions 
Another dimension that the US government took to put pressure on the Khartoum administration to stop the 
human rights violations was the use of economic sanctions which were solely imposed on the top leadership 
in government (Keith 2007:159). The US Congress in the late 2006 passed the Darfur Peace and 
Accountability Act (DPAA) that empowered the then president George W Bush executive powers to freeze 
the properties of the Sudanese government officials.The Act further empowered the President to freeze the 
property of other people who took part in the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the 
conflict (Power: 2006). The Act was also meant to bar any US citizens or institutions from conducting any 
business deals with the Sudanese oil industry.  
 
The Congress further proposed to promulgate an even tougher Act labelled “Plan B” which was intended to 
crack down on US multinationals that were in business connections with either the Sudanese government or 
the private institutions. However, there have been growing scepticism about whether  the Bush 
administration was being sencire in its promises or it was just lip servicing. This was mainly because in the 
end the government was seen to have been dragging its feet on the implementation part of the proposed Act 
(Kessler 2007). 
 
On economic sanctions as a way of mounting pressure to the Khartoum government to ending the rights 
violations in the Darfur, the US government was seen as instrumental in the proposition to the Security 
Council’s Resolution 1564. The proposition threatened the Omar al-Bashir government of international oil 
sanctions if it continued to dismiss Resolution 1556 by the SC (Karrah Ahmed 2010:07). These sanctions 
were called by the Bush administration in pursuance of the Khartoum admistration’s failure to allow for the 
expansion of the AU monitors within the worst affected areas of the Darfur region. The oil sanctions were 
particularly prefered by the US government with a view that the GoS would feel the economic pain as oil 
was the major source of revenue by the government. The United States government also knew that the 
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greatest portion of the oil revenue was used to financing the military operations both in the Darfur region 
and the South (Keith 2007). 
 
The U.S. government was careful in its imposition of sanctions on the parties that participated in the human 
rights violations, more particularly when these sanctions were being initiated through the Security Council. 
The Security Council’s Resolution 1672 came about as a result of the U.S. government’s insistence that the 
sanctions should not only be imposed to the GoS authorities. Washington insisted that those from the rebel 
groups who indeed perpetrated violence during the conflict should also be slapped with such restrictions 
(Kastner 2007:167). In the end, four individuals who were allegedly been responsible for crimes in Darfur 
were imposed with travel bans. These included Major General Gaffar Mohamed Elhassan (Sudanese army 
commander), Musa Hilal (from the Jalul Tribe), Adam Yacub Shant (SLA-commander), and Gabrill Abdul 
Kareem Badri (National Movement for Reform and Development). The United States of America approved 
such an approach of sanctioning both parties to the conflict, arguing that it was the source of strengthening 
both political and diplomatic relations and processes between the two countries (Security Council Res. 
1672:2006). 
 
 
(ii) Engagement through diplomatic Negotiations 
The US government’s commitment and determination to ending the Darfur conflict also came to exhibition 
during the N’djamena negotiations where telephonic calls were exchanged between the Khartoum and the 
Washington administrations (Slim 2004:825). The insistence by the Bush administration to encourage peace 
negotiations between the warring parties indicated how the US government preferred non-military 
intervention in the conflict. This was also evidenced by the American political leadership as part of the 
international community initiative to stop civilian massarces in the Darfur region by making financial 
assistance to the negotiations.  
 
The U.S. government alongside the British government and the European Union (EU) financed the Addis 
Ababa meeting by the AU and other stakeholders on the the Darfur conflict on the 8th of May 2004 (Slim 
2004). The resultant meeting contributed to the finalisation of the ceasefire commission process which had 
the responsibility of overseeing the N’djamena Agreement. The funding of inititiatives to end the Darfur 
conflict by the United States of American government came as both a political and diplomatic gesture to the 
Sudanese government and the African Union broadly. This was a relief to the continental body that struggled 
to finance vital projects in the continent. 
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However, it is also important to note that the involvement of the George. W Bush administration in the peace 
negotiations in both the North-South and the Darfur crisises was not solely as a result of the government’s 
foreign policy demands. Some scholars went as far as concluding that the US interceded directly in these 
peace talks as a result of pressure from both oil companies that heavily invested in the Sudanese petroleum 
industry as well as civic groups such as the evangelicals that advocated for the end to the crisis (Huliaras 
2006:721). Through this pressure from the corporate world and the civic organisations, the US government 
engaged the Khartoum administration. The US further promised Sudan a normal diplomatic relationship only 
if it worked for the attainment of peace, allowed humanitarian access to the needy Darfurian population and 
co-operate with the US on counter-terrorism. 
 
Although on face value the US’s intervention in the peace negotiations was perceived to be in the interest of 
the Darfurians, it is also clear that peace in the region was America’s priority. This was more importantly 
because the escalation of violence in Darfur in 2004 was worrisome to the Bush administration as it was a 
US election year (Mclaughlin:2004). This was a strategy by the Bush campaign team to appease the 
evangelical voter-base that was too critical about the human rights violations in Darfur perpetrated by the 
Muslim dominated Khartoum administration. This was in the context of how the evangelical voters 
participated and made George Bush to win the 2000 presidential election, particularly in the states President 
Bush won in the electoral college where 78% of the evangelicals voted for the Republicans (Durham 
2004:147). 
 
When the AU realized that the conflict in the Darfur region was slowly becoming not only a regional peace 
and security threat but an international problem, it initiated the deployment of the African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) in June 2004. The mission’s major responsibilities were to monitor the implementation of the 
N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the protection of the civilian population. However, the cash strapped 
AU had a number of logistical and manpower challenges which led to the opreration of the initial 
peacekeeping processes to take shape. For example on the 4th of June 2004, when the first three AU MILOBs 
in El Fashir arrived, they only had one Thuraya satellite phone that was to be used to link them to Addis 
Ababa, with not even any form of transport for the crucial patrols (Mensah 2010:08). The challenges of 
insufficient human resources, institutional expertise and training capacity at the African Union’s 
Commission for Peace and Security meant that the short and long-term objectives of the continental body 
would not have been fulfilled without external financial and technical support. 
 
Having faced with these financial, human resources, institutional expertise and training capacity challenges, 
the African Union Commission for Peace and Security secured the services of the Pacific Architectural 
Engineers (PAE) through the US State Department. The PAE assisted with the logistical support for the 
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AMIS which included the camp constructions, water and food provision for the deployed mission (Mensah 
2010:9). This included the construction of emergency accommodation for those African peacekeepers which 
were deployed on short notice. This was the United States of America’s government way of indirectly 
assisting the African Union peacekeeping operations in the Darfur region. Without external funding, the 
African Union would not have succeeded in its operational and logistical missions on the ground. 
 
(iii) Suppport in UN Peacekeeping Missions 
The US government in the early summer of 2005 after assessing the challenges that were being faced by the 
AU in dealing with the conflict in Darfur suggested that AMIS should be handed over to the UN peaceking 
force (de Waal 2007:1042). The argument and rationale for the proposal by the US government was that the 
UN would comparably do a better job with its highly resourced and trained personnel. This was in sharp 
contrast to the AU peacekeepers who were regarded ill-experienced to take on the peace support operation 
of the size and complexity that was required in the Darfur. This proposal was though not approved by both 
the UN security council and AU secretariat. The Khartoum government also opposed it citing the US’s 
national interests being the driving force for the proposal.  
 
In the same context, the US government continued to put diplomatic pressure both to the UN security council 
and the secretariat of the AU as well as the Sudanese government for the AU-UN forces to operate in the 
Darfur in the best interest of the civilian population. De Waal (2007:1042) states that the insistence by the 
Sudanese government to oppose the AU-UN peacekeeping in the country resulted in the UNSC to on the 
31st of August 2006 adopt Resolution number 1706. The resolution invited the Khartoum authorities to 
consent on the deployment of international peacekeepers, and that if the government does not afford the 
consent, then the forces would still be dispatched without the Sudanese government approval. 
 
President Omar al Bashir rejected Resolution 1706, and insisted that no international forces would be allowed 
in Sudan without the country’s consent. He in turn referred to the proposal as “colonialist” while at the same 
time linking the US government’s support for the initiative to “Jewish organizations” (Washington Post 
2006). This again resulted in the US government requesting the Chinese government to take part in the 
meeting that would be chaired by the UN Secretary General on the 16th of November 2006 where a 
compromise proposal for a ‘hybrid’ AU-UN force, the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 
was settled for. 
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(iv) Promotion of National Interests by the US 
Although the US government showed its determination to assist the Darfurian population from rights 
violations, there are reasonable grounds to indicate that in some instances there were clear failures and 
reluctance on the part of the American government to take decisive actions against the perpetrators. State 
Secretary Powell should be highly appreciated for his initiatives to visiting Sudan and recommending a 
financial assistance on the investigations that took place in Chad on refugees from the Darfur conflict. 
However, the questions that have to be answered by the US authorities revolve around the course of action 
on the results of the Chad study as well as what Powell got from his visit to the Darfur region in the company 
of the UN Secretary General.  
 
de Waal (2007:1041) argues that although the US State Department acknowledged that genocide took place 
in Darfur, it however stated on the 9th of September 2004 that such finding would not in any way alter or 
change the government’s foreign policy on Sudan. In that context, one would wonder what motivated the 
American government to in the first place initiate the visit to Sudan by the State Secretary and the conducting 
of the study on the refugees in Chad. 
 
Some scholars went on to suggest that the American government with its well trained army personnel and 
highly resourced military technology had the capacity to stage a humanitarian military intervention in Darfur 
together with its NATO allies. However, it was not to be, as there was much reluctance from a number of 
countries both in the NATO grouping and the African Union as an institution (Keith 2007:158). A 
combination of past experiences of military intervention in Kosovo and the geographical remoteness of 
Darfur from the sea and airbases made it highly improbable for the government of America to consider the 
use of force in resolving the conflict (International Crisis Group 2006c, 1-3, 17).  
 
It is however important to take note of the coincidence between the Darfur conflict with the US government’s 
intervention in the 2003 war in Iraq. The military intervention in Iraq meant that a substantial amount of both 
financial and human resources had to be channelled to the mission. In the context of America’s unilateral 
decision to enter Iraq, both the international community and the American citizenry had condemned the 
exercise. This in turn would have been another futile mission for the Bush administration to be seen 
channelling more other resources to the Darfur conflict at a time when the Khartoum administration had 
objected to international intervention. The ICG (2006c:17) further highlights that since the U.S. troops were 
both in Iraq and Afghanistan ( both traditional Muslim countries), the invasion of Sudan which is 
predominantly Muslim, would further polarize the relationship between America and the these communities 
across the globe. 
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Although the US government played a positive role in assisting both the ordinary Darfurian population and 
the various institutions in Sudan and the AU, there was still an element of resentment from mostly human 
rights defenders that included the Human Rights Watch and the Amnesty International. The blame from 
these human rights organizations on the part of the US government emanated from how the Bush 
administration prioritized its national interests when dealing with the abuse of the civilians by the GoS armed 
forces (Huliaras 2006:719). This can be interpreted as that Darfur in any way does not matter enough and in 
the contrary Sudan matters more in the face of the US government and the international community at large.  
 
The national interest factor of the US government on its dealing with the Khartoum administration emanates 
from the fact that the two countries have a close intelligence relationship regarding the war of terror. Grono 
(2006:628) explains that in 2005 the US government flew Salah Gosh, who was the Sudanese chief of 
intelligence to Virginia on a private plane to attend a bilateral meeting. The significance of the meeting meant 
that it was to include the members of the American Central Intelligence Agence (CIA) and other senior 
members of the Congress. Ironically, Salah Gosh is one of the architects of the Darfur atrocities, who in any 
way could have been taken with other perpetrators of violence to the ICC for prosecution. The US 
government with its CIA has since the September 11, 2001 terror attack begun to see Sudan as being “a top-
tier partner” mainly because of the two countries’ partnership in fighting Islamic terrorism (Jane’s 
Intelligence Digest 2005).  
 
However, dispite this close arrangement between the two administrations on fighting terrorism, the State 
Department’s 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism report indicated that Sudan ‘remained as one of United 
State designated state sponsors of terrorism’ (Huliaras 2006:718). Amongst other terrorist groups that were 
alleged to have still existed in Khartoum included the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas groups, the 
Egyptian groups of Islamic Jihad and al-Gama al Islamiyya as well as the Al Qaeda. All these terrorist groups 
posed as a security threat to the U.S. government as well as the international community. 
 
In the context of all the allegations of harbouring terrorist organisations within its borders, Sudan in May 
2003 made efforts to cooperate with the U.S. to clear out terrorists in the country. This was done through 
raiding all suspected terrorist training institutions, arresting all its citizens who were suspected of working 
with such groups and extraditing them to Saudi Arabia (Mills:2004). This cooperation between the two states 
was further boosted by the efforts of Sudan’s security institutions. The government of Sudan began to 
provide information on terrorist groups and their operations within the country to top U.S. officials. This in 
turn prompted the American State Department in early May 2004 to remove the country from the categories 
of states which were labelled ‘’non-cooperative’’ in the war on terrorism.  
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Now, in the context of the close cooperation between Khartoum and Washington, especially on issues to do 
with national interests such as state security, a number of human rights and social groups became more 
sceptical about the American government’s objectivity in handling the human rights violations that were 
taking place in the Darfur region within that period (Lobe 2001:02). This U.S.-Sudan dilemma was further 
compounded by the 9/11 attacks which meant that the American government remained with little choice than 
to be diplomatically associated with Sudan in an effort to solicit the much needed intelligence on terrorism 
(Huliaras 2006:718).  
 
The Evangelical activists were more puzzled by the U.S.’s immediate approval of Sudan as new ally. This 
was mainly because Sudan had previously worked hand in glove with Osama Bin Ladin for that long as well 
as participating in the gruesome human rights violations in both the South and in Darfur. In that context, one 
of the longest serving anti-Khartoum activists Eric Reeves clearly disapproved this arrangement when he 
said, “I can’t believe that [the administration] would be so cynical as to leave millions of sourthern Sudanese 
to their fate, just because a regime which has worked hand-in-glove with Bin Laden, says its opening files 
and may hand over a few suspects.”  This was indeed a clear approval of the U.S.’s prioritization of its 
national interests over the humanitarian crisis that unfolded in the Darfur region. 
 
               Lifting of Economic Sanctions 
The Obama administration on its announcement of the intention to lift economic sanction on the Sudan 
government through its United Nations Ambassador Samantha Power, argued that “a sea of change” of 
improvement in humanitarian access was taking shape in the country (Reeves:2017). But the question that 
has to be asked to the U.S. authorities (Obama administration) is what motivated the change of policy on the 
Sudanese government that warrants such sudden relaxations of economic sanctions? Has the Khartoum 
administration improved on the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region where human rights violations have 
still been reported? 
 
The shift in policy by the U.S. government on Sudan is said to have been motivated by a range of factors. 
The Sudanese government has been seen as a security and intelligence strategic partner in fighting and 
compating international terrorism. This is evidenced by the mutual relationship that developed between the 
two countries. This relationship was reflected in a way by Sudan’s head of the National Intelligence and 
Security Services (NISS), Mohamed Atta al-Moula’s visit to Washington DC. Mohamed Atta al-Moula 
visited the U.S. after being invited by the Director of the National Intelligence Agency (CIA) Mike Pompeo 
(Sudan Tribune:2017).  
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Reports suggested that the Sudanese security chief went on to meet with both the FBI Director James Comey 
together with the members of the Congress. Although the details and the agenda of the meetings could not 
be ascertained, the Sudanese official is said to have insisted that the American authorities had to be given 
first hand information about the humanitarian situation in Sudan as well as security and political state of the 
region. The aftermarth of the meeting and other bilateral engagements that took place between the two 
countries could have contributed to the U.S. government through the State Department issuing a statement 
in September 2016 welcoming the Sudanese government’s efforts to combating terrorism as well as its 
continued engagement with the American authorities (Reeves:2017). 
 
The close ties between Sudan and the U.S. government in their quest to end international acts of terror was 
further cemented by the speech given by the former chair of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Russell Feingold on the international 
terrorism reported which had been tabled by the State Department. In a statement he declared, “I take serious 
issue with the way the report [on international terrorism by the U.S. State Department] overstates the level 
of cooperation in our counterterrorism relationship with Sudan, a nation which the U.S. classifies as a state 
sponsor of terrorism. A more accurate assessment is important not only for effectively countering terrorism 
in the region, but as part of a review of our overall policy toward Sudan, including U.S. pressure to address 
the ongoing crisis in Darfur and maintain the fragile peace between the North and the South” (Feingold: 
2009).  
 
The above statement by Senator Feingold is a clear cut indication that the Obama administration seemed 
more worried with the counterterrorism measures that they were working on with their Sudanese 
counterparts. This was in direct contrast to what should have been a concern, i.e the genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity that the al-Bashir government was being accused of perpetrating 
(Reeves:2017). Economic sanctions were being lifted in exchange for counter-terrorism intelligence, in 
particular by Obama who previously as a senator, presidential hopeful as well as being a president had 
labelled the Darfur region as a site of “genocide”. 
 
The change of administration from Barack Obama to the Presidency of Donald Trump in 2017 did not bring 
about any policy shift regarding how the U.S. intended to operate with the Khartoum administration. The 
Trump administration was more inclined to exerting much of his energy on sustaining and prioritizing the 
domestic political dynamics than advancing foreign issues, in particular the African affairs. President 
Trump’s reluctance and disinterest in dealing with African affairs was evident. His administration’s failure 
to establishing a functioning Africa Bureau at the State Department as well as the non-appointment of an 
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Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs when he came into office were clear signs that African affairs 
were secondary priorities to his administration (Reeves:2017).  
 
These looked to be the earliest signs that the American government would in the near future lift its sanctions 
on the genocidal Khartoum regime. This was despite concerns that the country had until today shown no 
signs of improving the humanitarian conditions and assistance to the impoverished civilians. The insistence 
by the Sudanese government to deny humanitarian aid to civilians has left an estimated two million people 
without food, including refugees from Darfur in the eastern Chad, those in South Kordofan (though in South 
Sudan and Blue Nile), with young children being exposed to acute malnutrition (United Nations International 
Children’s Emergency Fund Report:2014). 
 
The U.S.’s intention to lift the economic sanctions in Sudan was further motivated by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) Administrator, Mark Green. When he visited North Darfur, 
he remarked that the American government would stand with the people of Sudan and that there were 
noticeable humanitarian improvements in the region. He however failed to acknowledge the high number of 
people who died of cholera (United States Agency for International Development:2017). The failure by the 
top USAID official to mention cholera by its name but referring to it as some incidences of, “acute watery 
diarrhea” was in direct tandem with the Sudanese government’s insistence that there were no cases of cholera 
outbreak in the Darfur. In a way this could be interpreted as Trump’s admittance that the economic sanction 
could still be lifted with or without the issues of humanitarian crisis bedevilling the region(Reeves:2017).  
 
The U.S. government ideally seemed to have deliberately failed to hear the voices of the local and 
international rights groups, ordinary people and some religious groups who claimed that there were countless 
cases of government refusing humanitarian assistance in various districts of Darfur. An estimated three 
million people in the Darfur region were reportedly in need of humanitarian aid but at the same time the 
National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) government continued to preventing the 
humanitarian aid agencies access to an estimated one million needy civilians (Radio Dabanga:2017). The 
reports further indicated that in the Eastern Jebel Marra in South Darfur, the outbreak of Cholera had 
intensified that on weekly basis a minmum of 24 deaths were recorded.  
 
The United States of America has been roundly condemned by various concerned stakeholders who wished 
to see the Khartoum administration remain under the economic restrictions from the U.S. government and 
the Security Council because of its failure to address the humanitarian concerns in the country. Both the 
Obama and Trump administrations were accused of having defended their cause to lifting the economic 
sanctions and thus failing to upholding the rights of civilians in Sudan for the following reasons: 
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(i) Since the beginning of 2017, there has been an increase in the number of children and the elderly 
from the Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps who succumbed to malnutrition as a result of 
insufficient food being accessed  (Sudan Tribune:2017). The World Food Programme which 
provided the bulk of the food needs in the IDPs was now either reducing the food rations in camps 
or was facing some logistical problems in making the food accessing the intended beneficiaries. 
(ii) The outbreak of cholera which both the U.S. and the Sudanese governments refused to 
acknowledge its devastating effects, had resulted in countless deaths both in the IDPs and in other 
areas where water supplies were eratic. Reports of deaths, illnesses and new infections were 
acknowledged in Hay El Salam, Midan El Kheil as well as in El Salam IDP camps where medical 
staff was failing to cope with the overwhelming arrivals (Radio Dabanga:2017). 
(iii) Accute shortages of medical services more especially in areas where civilians were vulnerable to 
the constant fighting, outbreak of communicable diseases and sexual harassment of women by 
mostly government sponsored militias. The failure by the government to provide adequate health 
services resulted in the death of not less than 30 people in the South Darfur. In the East Jebel 
Marra some 50 patients were reported to have been infected by cholera in the first week of July 
2017 (Radio Dabanga:2017). The eratic provision of health services were as a result of either the 
government’s failure to prioritize the health needs of the Darfurians or deliberately denied 
medical staff access to those in need of medical care. 
 
With these visible signs of non-compliance and failure by the Khartoum administration to uphold the 
international values of human rights preservation and rule of law in Sudan, the U.S. government went ahead 
to lifting the economic sanctions to Sudan. This supposedly only in the interest of intending to continue 
cooperating with the country in advancing the counter-terrorism goals. Efforts should however be made to 
establish what could be the immediate and long term effects of the lifting of these economic sanctions by the 
U.S. from the Sudanese government. The immediate such effects would be the further traumatization of an 
estimated 3 million non-Arab/African citizens of Darfur from the continued torture by the now relieved al-
Bashir government forces (Reeves:2017). 
 
2.3.2 The Chinese Government  
The relationship between China and the Sudanese government can be explained as an extension and 
culmination of the historical close ties between Beijing and the entire African continent in recent decades. 
Since its establishment as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, besides engaging in diplomatic 
relationships with the world’s economic and military powers that include the US and Rusia, China identified 
itself as one of the developing countries. It went further to relate with the Latin Americans, Asians and more 
importantly the African continent. Budabin (2009:526-527) postulates that China solidified its role as one of 
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the the world’s leading international actors during the 1954 Bandung Conference where 29 Asian and 
African delegates were hosted. This was when the Asia-Africa solidarity came into being and the ultimate 
formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, a situation that ended the bipolar monopoly and a creation of 
multi-polarity in the world order. 
 
(I) China’s Historical ties with the African Continent 
The influence of China to the African continent came into prominence in the post-Cold War era. This was 
the period when Africa had little or no strategic economic and political interest in both the US and Europe. 
The vacuum that was left by the US and the Western powers in the 1990s left the Chinese government with 
no choice but to engrave its extensive ties with the African continent, more particularly in the form of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), trade and development aid (Budabin 2009:527).  
 
The cooperation between the Chinese government with Africa was further enhanced by the creation of the 
China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000. Further to this, the China’s Africa Policy, a white paper which 
outlined the country’s objectives in closer cooperation between the two was created in early 2006. In 
November 2006, the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which was 
attended by 43 heads of state and a total of 48 African delagates was another occasion which further 
strengthened the China-Africa pact (Gill, Huang, & Morrison 2007:3). The government of China made a 
number of commitments to the African continent through the FOCAC Action Plan, chief among them include 
the revitalisation of the African agriculture by sending a total of 100 agrigultural experts that would establish 
some 10 agricultural demonstration sites in the continent. 
 
On the investment front, the Chinese government committed itself to supporting Chinese firms that invested 
in Africa through the China-Africa Development Fund amounting to US$5 billion. This would further 
provide US$3 billion in preferential loans as well as US$2 billion for preferential export buyers’ credit to 
African countries in the following three years (Gill et al, 2007). This was China’s long-term strategy to 
establish its economic muscles in the continent more particularly when the West and the U.S.A seemed to 
have sidelined most African states that were deemed to have been violating human rights. 
 
The government of China continued to strengthen its socio-economic and political ties with the African 
continent. In November 2006 Beijing announced that it would cancel a total of US$1.42 billion of African 
debt and that another US$1 billion would be cancelled in mid 2007 (Gill et al, 2007). Most of the African 
countries’ infrastructural development initiatives have been supported by Chinese government. The hosting 
of the annual Africa Development Bank conference in 2007 in Shanghai came in with Beijing pledging to 
make an additional US$20 billion infrastructural development in the continent for the following three years. 
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On international peace and security, the Chinese government has played its role and contributed in the UN 
peacekeeping operations in African countries that include Liberia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. About  ¾  of a total of 1 800 both military troops and civilian police that the Chinese government 
provided since May 2007 to the UN peacekeeping operations were destined for the African countries.  
 
Although China has been hailed for partnering with the African continent both in the economic, political and 
military fronts, questions have been raised on the sencirity of the Chinese government’s close ties with the 
government of Sudan. Such concerns were raised more particularly during the period of gross human rights 
violations in the Darfur region which started in early 2003. With the GoS being accused of co-opting the 
Janjaweed militia into the mainstream army and targeting the civilian population in the rebel controlled 
communities brutalizing them with impunity, the Chinese government seemed to have been aware of such 
abuses. 
 
In order to get a clear understanding of why the Chinese government seemed to be disinterested in 
intervening in the Darfur conflict to protect the rights of affected civilians, there has to be an indepth analysis 
of the Chinese government’s position on what comes first between human rights preservation and state 
sovereignty. Awu (2009:72) states that the Chinese government upholds sovereignty without any 
reservations and views it as a precondition to the observation of human rights. In this case, the position of 
China is that any measurement of human rights protection should not in any way override the principle of 
the sovereignty of the state.  
 
In the context of the prioritization of state sovereignty, its foeign policy is thus premised on state sovereignty 
being the embracer of three of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which are mutual respect of each 
other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-intervention in each other’s internal 
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Awu:2009). 
 
(ii) The Role in the Darfur Conflict 
The relationship between the government of Sudan and the People’s Republic of China dates back to 1959, 
when Sudan became the fourth African country to recognize the PRC. The two countries’ diplomatic, 
political and economic bonds were further cemented in the 1970s when the Chinese government built the 
Friendship Hall in Khartoum to symbolize the bilateral ties between the two countries (Loke:2009). China 
also militarily rescued the Sudanese government in 1971 during a failed coup by the Sudanese Communist 
Party when it provided military supplies as well as training of the Sudanese army during the war 
(Badabin:2009).  
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However, although the two countries boast of their historical relationships based on economic, military, 
political and social ties, questions have to be asked whether the Chinese government based its relationship 
with the Sudanese government to persue the interests of the Sudanese people or its national interests. Loke 
(2009:2006), further elaborates that, “the controversy over China’s relations with Sudan arises from 
international concerns that China’s policies with a pariah state are undermining global human rights norms, 
aid conditionality measures, and global governance, particularly in light of the ongoing humanitarian crisis 
in Darfur”. This is an attitude that the Chinese government followed, that dispite widespread evidence of  
human rights violations taking place in the Darfur region that were being perpetrated by the Khartoum 
authorities, it was life as usual between Beijing and Khartoum. 
 
But what could have been the connecting point between the two countries which made China to take a 
defensive route when it came to the international condemnation of events that unfolded in the Darfur? Since 
1993 when China became an oil importer, the acquisition of enegy supplies became the Chinese 
government’s major national interest. This ultimately became more important to the country’s economic 
growth. China has been accused of purchasing oil from Sudan as well as selling military weapons to 
Khartoum, the majority of which was allegedly used in the ethnic conflict in the Darfur (Wu:2009). The 
Western media further alleged that an estimated 70% of the Sudanese total export  went to China, while an 
approximate 70% of the oil export revenue was used by the Sudanese government on the acquisition of 
military ammunition from China to be used in the Darfur conflict.  
 
On investment, sources from within the Chinese statistics indicate that in 2004 alone, the government of 
China made an estimated $146.70 million outward foreign direct investment to Sudan. This was in direct 
comparison to the entire African continent which received a total of $317.43 million. This comparison on 
Chinese investment between Africa and the government of Sudan constitutes an astonishing three times more 
than any other African state (Awu:2009). Sudan exports a total of 64% of its crude oil to China. Research 
has revealed that a sizeable number of Chinese petroleum companies have invested in the Sudanese oil 
industry, which makes it imperative for both governments to maintain cooperation to avoid economic 
disruptions ( Reeves: 2006).  
 
The oil investment in Sudan by the Chinese industry dates back to the 1980s. This was when two main 
petroleum actors, Chevron and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) discovered an estimated 180 
million barrels of oil reserves in the Republic of Sudan (Ravindran & Xiao’ou: 2012). The participation of 
Chinese petroleum corporation in Sudan was made more lucrative in light of the American government’s 
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prohibition of its companies to invest in the oil industry due to the imposition of economic sanctions to the 
country (Dagne 2004). 
 
It is however important to note that though the government of China made such huge economic investments 
in Sudan, the social and economic spin-offs of such investments did not in any way translate into benefiting 
the Darfurian population. This was one of the grievances that made the rebel groups to perceive China as an 
enemy which took advantage of the escalation of the conflict to amass economic gains in the country. This 
anger from the rebel groups could have triggered the kidnapping of two Chinese workers (Li Lijun and Jia 
Huipeng) by the members of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) group led by Abedel Wahid al-Nur on the 
14th of March 2004 (Ahmed: 2010). The incident took place some 50 kilometres from the Buram region 
while the workers were drilling wells for the local inhabitants. 
 
As a result of China’s economic interests broadly in the African continent and in particular the Sudanese 
government, it has sought to disregard the mounting pressure from the international community to summon 
the Khartoum administration with regard to the Darfur humanitarian crisis. The defence brought forward by 
Beijing had much do with its non-interference position with regard to states’ sovereignty.  This in turn 
hobbled the United Nations Security Council’s effectiveness in tackling the Darfur crisis (Keith 2004).  
 
The issue of the international community’s need to uphold states sovereignty was advanced by the Chinese 
government when it came to the upgrading of the AU peacekeeping mission in Sudan to the UN. This only 
happened after Beijing argued that the resolution to that effect can only be upheld with the consent of the 
Sudanese government (Associated Press 2007). On the same peacekeeping issue, the Chinese government 
threatened to exercise its vetoe powers to dumpen the resolutions’ content, to the effect that the Security 
Council be prevented from taking further actions in the event of Khartoum’s failure to accept the coming in 
of the United Nations peacekeepers within its borders (Reeves 2006).  
 
It is however important to take note of how China handled the Darfur conflict from its inception in February 
2003 to 2006. This was the period when international pressure from the Security Council in particular the 
United States of America and its Western allies started to isolate Beijing. The isolation of China by the 
international community emanated from  its failure to take appropriate action against the Khartoum 
administration for its frequent civilian abuses in the Darfur. According to Awu (2009:80), the United Nations 
Bibliographic Information System detailed how the Chinese government participated in the United Nations 
Security Council regarding the Darfur conflict between 2003 when the conflict formally began and 2006. 
This was the period when the government of China felt that it had to change its foreign policy particularly 
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towards regimes that were accused of human rights violations. Out of the ten UNSC Resolutions proposed 
on Sudan, the government of China abstained on six which are as follows: 
(i) Resolution 1547 (2004): On endorsing the deployment of international monitors and the imposition 
of arms embargo on the government of Sudan; 
(ii) Resolution 1564 (2004): On expanding the monitoring mission in Darfur and on the establishment of 
an international commission of inquiry to investigate all human rights abuses in Darfur; 
(iii) Resolution 1590 (2005): On the establishment of a Security Council Committee to monitor 
implementation of the measures in Darfur; 
(iv) Resolution 1593 (2005): Referring the situation in the Darfur region to the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court; 
(v) Resolution 1672 (2006): On the implementation of measures specified in paragraph 3 of resolution 
1591 (2005) with respect to Sudanese individuals; 
(vi) Resolution 1706 (2006): On the expansion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS) to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement. 
Such was the Chinese government to the international community within the UNSC concerning its 
inclination towards the Khartoum administration. Beijing was further accused of intending to use its veto 
powers to block the Security Council from passing tough proposals such as imposition of economic 
sanction to the Sudanese regime. 
 
However with time, the Chinese government succumbed to mounting international pressure from both state 
and nonstate actors to change its lenient approach on the Khartoum government (Awu: 2009). This resulted 
in the Beijing administration to start reassessing its role in dealing with the crisis more particularly after 
realizing that there was a noticeable gap between Khartoum’s rhetoric and the obvious escalations on the 
ground (Ahmed:2010). In the end, the Chinise government resolved to take a tough stance on the Sudanese 
authorities more particularly prior to the launching of the ‘Genocide Olympics’. The abstention by China on 
the Security Council Resolution 1556, that compelled the Khartoum administration to fulfil its commitment 
of disarming the Janjaweed militia and prosecuting their leaders was also another indication that there was 
a common understanding within the international community on the Darfur crisis. 
 
 It is however important to highlight that the exact period at which the Chinese government succumbed to 
international pressure is subject to debate. This is more particularly because some scholars date back the 
period to mid-2004 when Beijing started to no longer offer Khartoum unconditional support (Ahmed: 2010). 
The change of stance by the Beijing administration to the Sudanese government was explained to have been 
a result of both the international community pressure. The Western block and the United States of America 
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insisted that China should stand up and be a responsible stakeholder in international affairs by restraining 
Sudan from the continued human rights abuses in Darfur.  
 
Ahmed (2010:06) further argues that, “ trends within Chinese foreign policy circles began to call for a review 
of Chinese foreign policy and strengthening efforts to co-operate with other major (i.e. Western) powers.” 
The proponents of the review of the foreign policy and better co-ordination between China and the West 
were mainly concerned with the “outcome of Chinese policies towards Iran, Sudan and North Korea.” 
 
2.3.3 The European Union 
The European Union (EU) participated and contributed within the armpit of the international community in 
finding ways of resolving the long standing crisis of Darfur. There were however two ways in which the 
organisation contributed in the crisis resolution. The first one was by taking part as a collective EU body 
whereby the organisation took a responsibility to engage the Sudanese authorities. The second one was 
through each individual member state bilaterally working with the government of Sudan.  
 
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands and France were the major financial contributors 
in either the short-term humanitarian assistance or the long-term developmental initiatives in the Darfur 
region. It is also important to take note that the EU’s engagement with the GoS was mainly through the AU, 
especially on matters to do with foreign security policy. This was mainly because it intended to strengthen 
the continental body (AU) and ultimately respond to major crises and offering support in the form of the 
African Peace Facility (APF) (Gya 2010). 
 
The EU also took into cognisance the fact that Sudan comes from an Arab background, and in that context 
made efforts to engage the Arab League (AL) on the Darfur crisis. The European Union Special 
Representative (EUSR) for Sudan regularly visited the League in Cairo, Egypt to engage the regional body 
on its efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis.  The relationship between these two continental bodies, especially 
through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are all indications that the EU takes the AL as an important 
stakeholder in finding a lasting solution to the Darfur crisis. However, the complication of involving the 
Arab community in the Darfur conflict is premised on the nortion that the AL does not perceive Darfur as 
an Arab constituency, and Sudan’s problems are regarded as more African matters that Arab worries (Gya 
2010). 
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  (i) Peacekeeping and Logistics 
The European Union had initially discussed modalities of militarily intervening in the Darfur crisis. 
However, suddenly the 27 member state organisation lacked the will and capacity which led to the idea of 
the military operation being downsized to a supporting mission in Sudan (Gya 2010). The United Kingdom 
being one influencial member of the EU block made it clear that a military option would inflame the situation 
in the region. This was more especially on taking into cognisance the possibility of underming the ongoing 
Naivasha peace talks between the GoS and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) that 
were already in place (Bellamy & Williams 2006). 
 
The African Union’s Peace And Security Council (PSC) was responsible for the establishment of the 
Ceasefire Commission which in turn authorised the establishment of the AMIS peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur. The EU did not contribute any combat boots (only 19 personnel out of the strong 18 775 strong 
UNAMID peacekeepers) on the ground for two main reasons. Firstly, the Khartoum administration through 
President Omar al-Bashir did not approve any military personnel from the west. This he argued that it was a 
symbol of the colonisation of a sovereign Sudan and Africa as a continent. Secondly, the EU opted to provide 
financial and logistical support to the AU forces which participated in the protection of both the civilians 
and humanitarian operation (de Waal: 2007).  
 
The AMIS was deployed in the Darfur to monitor and verify the ceasefire violations, protection of civilians 
who were considered to be under imminent threat from both rebels, government forces and Janjaweed militia. 
They were also responsible for undertaking confidence-building mechanisms amongst parties to the conflict 
and taking care of the internally displaced people and refugees crossing into Chad (Kieh, Jr 2008).  
 
The financial aid on the AMIS operation was from the EU as an institution and as individual European 
countries that included the United Kingdom, France and Germany, while the United States of America and 
Canada contributed as well (Akuffo 2010). It is important to note that the basis of the EU’s idea of financial 
aid was a result of the lack of material resources and expertise on the part of the AU to fully offer the security 
services that was required in the Darfur region during the crisis. AMIS forces lacked strategic and operational 
strengths, the military-civil coordination as well as resources for operating with on the ground which 
included medical services (Mansaray 2010).  
 
The lack of adequate communication facilities such as telephones, intelligence gathering equipment in the 
AMIS bases meant that information gathering and transmission was hampered and this in turn negatively 
affected how the forces operated. Considering both the geographical and demographic status of the Darfur 
region, the initial 162 military and civilian AMIS personnel together with another 24 support staff on a 
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US$26 million, could not have been anything near the required number of military personnel to provide 
peacekeeping duties in the volatile and unstable area of Darfur. 
 
With the shortages of equipment, personnel, financial support and basic training facilities, the AU could not 
be tempted to turn down the offer from the EU on the financial aid, logistical support and training of the 
AMIS forces which participated in the Darfur. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) which 
falls under the supervision of the European Parliament (EP) over the external budgetary operations has 
recently been ineffective in carrying out its duties in providing sufficient attention to security concerns of 
member states (Gya 2010). This in turn resulted in member states taking the responsibility of driving the 
organisation’s direction of military and civilian crisis response reactions.  
 
The EU’s  Africa Peace Facility (APF) provided 305 million euros to the AU for the AMIS operations. This 
amount also included another 38.5 million euros from the voluntary contributions by eight individual 
member states  (Mansaray 2010). This contribution by the EU and member states to AMIS represents thus 
far the biggest financial contribution to an African peacekeeping mission from the APF. Such a support 
remained in place until December 2007 when the United Nation/African Union (UNAMID) hybrid operation 
started to take responsibility of the peacekeeping operations in the region. 
 
     (ii) Peace Talks and Agreements 
The EU as an organisation as well as individual member states played a crucial role in the Darfur peace 
settlement through their direct and indirect participation in the negotiations with other relevant stakeholders. 
The participation of the EU in the diplomatic resolution of the crisis was noticed in both the April 2004 
N’Djamena Ceasefire talks and the July 2004 Inter-Sudanese Talks on Darfur (de Waal 2007:1040). In the 
preparatory stages of the N’Djamena talks, while Chad became the main official mediator, the EU being 
represented by the French participated in the preliminary meetings. These meetings also included the United 
States of America, the British, Dutch, AU, the UN envoy to Sudan and Geneva’s Centre for Humanitarian 
Dialogue (Slim 2004:816).  
 
Although the leading role of mediation was within the African Union’s relm, the Khartoum administration 
had given an impression to the Dutch government that it could be the potential leading mediator. This came 
about as a result of some EU embassies in Khartoum which included the British and the Dutch had expressed 
their concerns on the ongoing deteriorating situation in the Darfur in the late 2003 (de Waal 2004). The 
Dutch was suggested to have been the most ideal and capable mediator between the GoS and the different 
rebel groups in the conflict. 
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The EU was also visible in the Inter-Sudanese Talks on Darfur which was hosted in the Nigerian capital of 
Abuja in July 2004. The talks were co-hosted by the African Union and the government of Chad and it 
covered issues to do with the power-sharing, wealth sharing and security (Lanz n.d: 78). The first rounds of 
the negotiations faced challenges and no substantive progress was made, with the adoption of the Declaration 
of Principles by the parties which framed the core principles for the settlement of the crisis.  
 
The splitting of one of the main parties and rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army made the 
talks to take a snag. This in process resulted in the EU which was the main funder of the negotiations to lose 
patience on the whole process of talks between the two parties (Lanz n.d: 78). In turn, the AU was in April 
2006 forced to set a deadline with the parties for the conclusion of the talks. Subsequently, this resulted in 
the mediators drafting a comprehensive agreement before the expiry of the AU deadline.  
 
In the meantime the EU came to Abuja, Nigeria to take part in convincing the parties in the talks to sign the 
agreement. Ultimately on the 5th of May 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed between the 
GoS and one faction of the SLM/A led by Abdel Wahid while the JEM distanced itself from the arrangement 
(Nathan 2006:3). The failure by the Justice and Equality Movement to take part in the signing of the Darfur 
Peace Agreement both weakened and complicated the intended objectives by the mediators to reaching a 
peaceful resolution. 
 
On the security aspect of the Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement (2006), Article 25 deals with the Strengthening 
of the Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms. Its aim is among others to mandate the AU and 
its international partners to ensure that the peacekeeping forces in the form of AMIS has the appropriate 
resources and equipment to fulfil its duties in the region. The EU participated in the Ceasefire Commision 
as stated in Article 25 (240) “The Ceasefire Commission shall be chaired by the AMIS Force Commander. 
The European Union representative shall be the second Vice Chair of the Ceasefire Commission.”   
 
Section 241 further states that representatives of the EU, the United States of America and the United Nations 
will also be participating in the commission as observers. The involvement of the EU in the Darfur ceasefire 
arrangement was an important step taken by both the AU and other stakeholders concerned mainly because 
of the organisation’s initial contribution in funding the various programs in the region. It is particularly 
important to highlight that the participation of the European Union in the African Union projects was based 
on the financial resources deficiencies on the part of Africa. 
 
The participation of the EU and its individual member states was concluded in the Darfur Peace Agreement 
Article 33 on the signing and witnessing of the agreement. In the witnessing of the agreement, Pekka 
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Haavisto represented the EU, Mr Hilary Benn representing the United Kingdom (Secretary of State for 
International Development), Dr Kjell Hodnebo representing the Norwegien government, Ambassador Henri 
de Coignac as a Special Envoy of the Republic of France and Mrs Agnes Van Ardenne, Minister for 
Development Cooperation of Netherlands. The participation of these representatives provides a narrative 
that the European Union as an international stakeholder played a vital role in the Darfur conflict resolution.  
 
2.3.4 Advocacy Groups, Civil Society And Non-State Actors 
Civil society, rights groups, media and various advocacy groups took an active role both within Sudan and 
across the globe to make known the human rights violations in the Darfur crisis (Mamdani 2009). In 
condemning these violations, the civil society and advocy groups did not only confine the blame to the 
Khartoum administration alone, but there were other international key players which contributed to the 
continued exploitation and abuse of civilian rights in Sudan. China for example became one of the major 
external stakeholders both as a permanent Security Council member and as Khartoum’s major economic 
partner to be involved in the Darfur conflict, but failed to play its role of protecting civilians in the crisis.  
 
The failure by China to take a strong stand on Sudan was primarily premised on its non-interference principle 
and this enabled Khartoum to hobble the United Nations Security Council to take strong actions against the 
regime. Although the Chinese government supported the upgrading of the AMIS peacekeeping mission in 
Darfur to the AU-UN hybrid mission, it however insisted that, “[a]ny solution would have to respect Sudan’s 
sovereignty,” which in that context implied that the Sudanese regime had the right to veto (Associated Press 
2007). Basing on the Chinese government’s failure to take the Sudanese government to task in repect of 
human rights violations both within the Darfur communities, internally diplaced camps and as refugees in 
the surrounding countries, the international advocacy groups, civil society and other non-state actors 
campaigned for the international community to take action against the Beijing authority. 
 
         Save Darfour Campaign 
The Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) is a conflict resolution advocacy group constituted by more than 75 
concerned organisations and individuals with a membership of over 130 million. It was formed in the United 
States of America on the backdrop of the humanitarian crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. It was formed 
on the 14th of July 2004 at the Darfur Emergency Summit with initial funding coming from the United States 
Holocaust Memorial Museum Committee of Concience (USHMCC), the American Jewish World Service 
(AJWS) and the City University of New York (Mamdani 2009). In the interest of the Darfurian citizens, the 
SDC devised a program of international venue-shopping in the hope of liveraging the Sudanese government 
and identified China as an accomplice in the human rights violations which were taking place in the region 
since the inception of the civil crisis in February 2003. 
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During the Beijing Summer Olympics of 2008, there were more than 200 countries that participated in the 
quadrennial ritual of competition. This in turn prompted the SDC to take this opportunity to campaign against 
the human rights abuses in the Darfur under the watchful eyes of China (Budabin 2009 :521).The SDC 
campaign was conducted from within the USA through international media, and the Beijing  Games were 
rebranded the “Genocide Olympics”, which in turn attracted international and public interest and 
subsequently threatened the country’s image. The SDC did not only put pressure to the government of China 
as an ally of the Sudanese authorities, but also worked with other related advocacy organisations within the 
United States of America. The main objective being to convince the US government and the rest of the 
international community that the Darfur crisis had gone out of humanitarian levels.  
 
The engagement of the SDC with the US government resulted in the US Congress passing more than ten 
pieces of legislations between 2005 and 2006 to commit funding for the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 
supporting divestment initiatives as well as denouncing the levels of violence in the Darfur (Budabin 
2009:537). This campaign directed at the US government meant that the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) had to inject millions of dollars in an effort to addressing the 
humanitarian needs of the civilian population of the Darfur (United States Agency for International 
Development: 2009). It is also important to note that the SDC was considered to be a very powerful coalition 
in the American politics mainly because the membership of the organization were known to have close links 
with the Congress (Morrison 2008). 
 
It was on the realization that the US government was injecting millions of dollars to the Darfur crisis through 
the USAID that President George W.Bush, “signalled his concern for the Darfur by decrying the mass 
killings as ‘genocide’, and signing the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA) of 2006” (Baker 2007). 
The Bush administration through the pressure from the SDC further tasked the US representatives at the 
United Nations to make propositions for the Sudanese government to be tasked to resolve the ongoing crisis. 
Although the SDC made frantic efforts to give the US government enough pressure to change the Darfur 
humanitarian status qua, many advocates in the organisation believed that President Bush and his 
administration had done more than enough and that there could not be any possibility of further action at its 
disposable (Budabin 2009:537). 
 
There were other civic groups and individual Americans within the United States of America who also 
worked closely with the SDC especially in exerting pressure to the Chinese government to take a strong and 
firm stand against the brutal Sudanese government. In August 2004, for example, a Senior Fellow at the 
Brookings Institute, Roberta A. Cohen wrote to The Washing  Post expressing his displeasure and concern 
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over Chinese government’s inaction over the human rights violations in the Darfur region by the Khartoum 
administration. Part of his letter called for China to use its economic leverage to urge President Omar al-
Bashir and his government to respect the calls by the international community for respect of the international 
humanitarian laws. He highlighted that, “Were China to use even a small part of its leverage to call Sudan 
to account, it would go a long way towards saving lives in Sudan” (Cohen: 2004). China in a way was 
regarded by both the international and local non-governmental stakeholders to be more influencial in 
persuading Khartoum to ending human rights violations in the Darfur.  
 
Widespread campaigns by both international media and students across the globe about the Chinese and the 
Sudanese governments coorperated in bilateral economic partnerships gained momentum. This in turn 
resulted in one of the economic advocate groups, the Sudan Divestment Task Force (SDT) publishing reports 
on how the two governments extensively coorperated economically (Sudan Divestment Task Force: 2009). 
This was a campaign in which US-based assets which invested in Chinese  companies were targeted for 
divestment for doing business with Sudan and its corporate associates. In this context, the international 
community being led by the US government had coordinated in putting both economic and political pressure 
on Beijing for its reluctance to isolate Sudan. 
 
In order to attract international attention and publicity, the SDC took a step further by establishing 
transnational networks mainly of like-minded groupings that were sourced from nations with media visibility 
and credibility (Dudabin 2009:545). These transnational networks which the SDC picked included the US 
Olympic Gold Medalist Joey Cheek as well as the UCLA Water Polo player Brand Greiner. The two were 
in 2007 instrumental in the founding of the Team Darfur (TD), an international grouping of international 
athletes who committed themselves to participate in making public awareness campaigns against the human 
rights violations in the Darfur region (Bixby:2009).  
 
The SDC contributed to the success of Team Darfur through the donation of financial and human resources 
to the organisation. Through the financial and human resources support from the SDC and other related 
funders, the organization had grown to more than 450 athlete members from around 60 countries. The 
objective of the transnational network was to make Darfur a public issue and also for journalists to fill sports 
pages with athlete biographies and the cause of Darfur (Save Darfur Coalition:2009). 
 
            Dream for Darfur 
The continued political, economic and military connection between the Chinese and Sudanese governments 
at the expense of the Darfurian population led to other Sudan activists which included long-time Sudan 
columnist Eric Reeves to insist on advocating for the humanitarian crisis to end. In January 2007, Reeves 
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took advantage of his presence at the SDC strategy meeting to submit his proposal for the targeting of the 
Beijing Olympics with other renowned activists by founding a separate organization from the SDC.This 
organization was formed for the purpose of holding Beijing accountable for its complicit neglect of the 
abused Darfurians (Reeves:2006). The Dream for Darfur (DFD) was thus a brain-child of various activists. 
These included actress and United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) ambassador 
Mia Farrow, her son Ronan, and Hollywood director Steven Spielberg. The organization’s first grant of half 
a million dollars came from Humanity United (HU), an international foundation that advocates for the 
abolishment of slavery and mass atrocity (Budabin 2009:540). 
 
However it is important to note that while the SDC’s main objective on China was to campaign for the total 
boycott of the Beijing Olympics by the more than 200 countries anticipated, the DFD was hoped for a slightly 
different goal. Its hope and goal was, “to leverage the Olympics to urge China to use its influence with the 
Sudanese regime to allow a robust civilan protection force into Darfur” (Dream for Darfur:2009). The DFD 
did not only exert pressure directly to the Chinese government, but also focused its attention to indirect 
targets and stakeholders. The targeted stakeholders included the International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
the US Olympic Committee, individual athletes, corporate sponsors, international media, the US Congress 
and the United Nations. It however became increasingly difficult to convince both the corporate sponsors 
and or the IOC to boldly condemn the Beijing administration (DFD:2008). 
 
The Dream for Darfur did not only confine its campaign on the Darfur genocide, but also participated in the 
financing and coordination of a transnational network that comprised of communities that survived genocide 
from other countries (Dudabin 2009:546). During the run up to the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics, the 
DFD made a symbolic Olympic torch relay that went through Rwanda, Armenia, Germany, Cambodia, and 
Bosnia. The event was made up of the members of the DFD, a Darfur genocide survivor as well as other 
survivors from other countries holding press conferences that highlighted human rights violations 
perpetrated by the Sudanese government. 
 
          Amnesty International 
Although the government of Sudan (GoS) restricted international organizations the entry and access to most 
regions of Darfur where violence against civilians was occurring, Amnesty International (AI) in one way or 
another participated and assisted those who needed help in the region. The AI participated in the Darfur crisis 
through engaging the Khartoum administration officials and members of the rebel groups as well as 
researching on the human rights situation in the region. 
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The alleged use of chemical weapons which included “poisonous smoke” by the Sudanese government forces 
ostensibly aimed at rebel forces between January and September 2016 in the Jebel Marra had dire 
consequences to the Darfurians. This resulted in the death of between 200 and 250 people who included 
mostly children and made it imperative for AI to investigate and expose the levels of civilian abuse in the 
region (Amnesty International 2016:5). The Sudanese government had however not approved the AI 
chemical weapons investigations and further dared to expel the officers who took part in the process. 
 
The intervention by AI in the Jebel Marra region in the Darfur was one in many of the direct and indirect 
participation of civic organisations in efforts to addressing the levels of humainitarian crisis in the war torn 
region. The report which came out of the AI investigations detailed comprehensively the serious violations 
of international humanitarian law and international human rights law by the Sudanese government on the 
civilian population. The remote investigation by the AI exposed not only the use of chemical weapons on 
the rebel groups but overwhelming evidence of war crimes and possibly crimes against humanity. Cases of 
indiscriminate bombings, unlawful killings of civilians, the abduction and rape of women, looting and 
destruction of entire villages, and forced displacement of an estimated quarter-million civilians were not 
unusual (Reeves:2017).  
 
However, these investigations were hampered by the government’s deliberate restrictions of access to the 
Jebel Marra on both national and international human rights investigators, journalists and any other 
humanitarian actors (AI 2016:7). Given such restrictive measures by the government, lack of reliable mobile 
communication devices and fears by the local communities who attempted to provide information, it became 
more and more difficult for the investigators to get information from both the affected civilians, rebels as 
well as the government armed forces.  
 
With these challenges of soliciting information at play, AI investigators opted to rely on information sourced 
from a Netherlands based radio station which exclusively reported on the Sudan crisis (Radio Dabanga). 
Amnesty International also solicited much of the information from some other local human rights monitoring 
organizations which dedicated their work on the rights violations taking place in the Jebel Marra crisis. This 
was still however most difficult as the government forces had put surveillance mechanisms mainly on the 
operations of the local human rights activists to foil their attempts to work with the international world. 
 
The participation of the Amnesty International in the Darfur conflict was not only confined to the 2016 Jebel 
Marra chemical weapons usage by the government forces. The New York Times published a series of articles 
which highlighted and exposed massive human rights violations in the entire Darfur region. The AI in 
collaboration with other human rights defenders such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and International 
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Crisis Group (ICG) actively lobbied for the international community to take appropriate action against both 
the Chinese government and Sudan (Prendergast 2004: A23). It became more clearer that the crisis in the 
Darfur region could not have been resolved by individual organizations but a collective institutions that had 
to positively engage the two parties of the conflict. 
 
 
                     Human Rights Watch 
 Human Rights Watch (HRW) is an international non-governmental organization which basically focuses on 
human rights activism through research and advocacy. The advocacy group works with governments, human 
rights abusers as well as policy makers in efforts to denounce the exploitation of the most vulnerable groups 
such as chidren, women, political prisoners and migrants. 
 
During the Darfur crisis, HRW took a pivotal role in engaging the international community, the Sudanese 
government, various factions of the rebel groups as well as the affected civilian population. This was done 
in order to alleviate the human rights violations that were being escalated in the region by the fighting 
between the GoS forces and the rebel groups.  
 
It is through the HRW’s intervention that resulted in the Darfur crisis to be put on the domain of the 
international media. This in the end ultimately prompted the US and the United Nations Secretariat to serve 
notice to the Khartoum administration to immediately halt the human rights violations in the region 
(Habibi:2004). It was through the participation of the Amnesty International (AI) and the HRW that the 
brutal assault of civians by the Janjaweed militia was exposed. This in the end made it more difficult for the 
government to continue raping, murdering and enslaving the non-Arab population. 
 
On the abuse and violations of human rights to the vulnerable groups such as women and children, the HRW 
stressed that the government forces (the Rapid Support Forces) and the Janjaweed militia assaulted, raped, 
shot and threatened victims with impunity (United States Department of State:2015). The U.S. State 
Department further revealed that in the 2015 HRW report Men Without Mercy, the RSF raped and abused 
their victims in a “systematic” pattern. The report chronicled events that took place on the 9th of June 2015 
in which dozens of women and girl children were exposed to government forces’ gang-rape in Golo in the 
Central Darfur (Human Rights Watch:2015). These violations were exposed prior to other cases of women 
and children abuses that occurred in January where the HRW reported that a campaign of indiscriminate 
raping of civilians which included minors took place in the villages of Bardani. The violations were 
reportedly perpetrated by the government sponsored RSF. Although the United Nations made some efforts 
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to investigate, their efforts were foiled as the government could not allow the investigators access to both 
the affected civilians and perpetrators. 
 
However, although the HRW like many other international non-governmental organizations can be hailed 
and praised for exposing the human rights violations that were perpetrated by the government in the Darfur 
region, questions were raised as to why it took so long for the condemnation of the violations. Despite the 
intensity, widespread, scale, scope and duration of the atrocities in the Darfur, this has never been a priority 
for such international organizations as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International as well as the United 
Nations (Habibi: 2004).  
 
These organizations were alleged to have either neglected to report such cases or to quietly report in a low 
profile. It is also important to note that HRW partners such as the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights came under scrutiny after it was also accused of having taken the issue of Darfur at its 2004 session. 
Although the human rights violations in the Darfur were tabled at the 2004 session, questions were raised as 
to why the Commission failed to name and shame the Khartoum administration which had become the 
world’s worst human rights serial offender (Habibi:2015). In the same way other international stakeholders 
have been accused of not having done enough to protect the Darfurians, the HRW and the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights can also be accused to have failed the civilians in the Darfur region. 
 
2.3.5 The International Criminal Court 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a treaty-based international legal institution which came about as 
a result of negotiations between states. Its jurisdiction is premised on embracing, investigating, trying and 
punishing individuals responsible for three categories of international crimes which are genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes (Franceschet 2004:32). There is no proper enforcement mechanisms as 
well as direct jurisdiction over international crimes within the structures of the ICC. The institution is 
however only reliant on the principle of complementarity (Kastner 2007:153). This thus entails that the ICC 
can only act where states are either unable and or unwilling to prosecute those responsible for contravening 
the provisions of the international laws, and in those countries where the national judiciary can prosecute, 
the ICC has no jurisdiction such as in the United States of America (Zeidy:2002).  
 
The principle of complementarity that is used by the ICC to prosecute international crimes within states is 
also preambled by Articles 1, 17 and 18 of the Rome Statute where the state and its national judiciary is 
given primary responsibility to prosecute. The ICC can thus only be called on to prosecute in circumstances 
where the national judiciary has failed and or has no capacity to carry out the assignment (Cassese 1999:159). 
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Since the establishment of the ICC in 2002, more than two-thirds of the African Union (AU) member states 
have become parties to the treaty establishing this global legal institution (du Plessis, Maluwa & O’Reilly 
2013:2). However the AU has had on numerous occasion experienced frosty relationships with the ICC 
which in turn resulted in its Assembly adopting critical resolutions against the Rome Statute institution. The 
AU’s critical stance on the ICC was purely based on biaseness and inequality regarding the prosecutorial 
approaches taken by the Rome Statute when it comes to African members states.  
 
To begin with, the AU argued that the Security council made referrals to the ICC cases mostly in response 
to Western governments’ pronouncements without getting it from the alleged perpetrators (Franceschet 
2004:34). The skewed power relations in the United Nations Security Council has been alleged by the AU 
to be the genesis of the ICC’s biased approach to either the African countries or broadly the developing 
global south. The referral of cases by the Security Council on African countries to the ICC and failure to 
reciprocate on conflicts in Syria, Israel as well as the U.S. and the United Kingdom’s crimes against humanity 
in Iraq are some of the AU’s worries on the operations of the ICC (du Plessis, Maluwa & O’Reilly 2013:2). 
 
(i) Intervention in the Darfur 
The violence in the impoverished region of Darfur which had started in February 2003 resulted in widespread 
torture, murder, sexual violations on women and children, looting and destruction of property by the GoS 
forces in cahoots with Janjaweed militia(Amnesty International:2005). Human rights and humanitarian 
organisations estimated that within the first eighteen months, an estimated 1800 000 people had lost their 
lives, while in excess of two million had been displaced  (BBC News 2004).  
 
The GoS’s refusal to allow international humanitarian aid organisations access to the region meant that the 
ordinary people on the streets were deprived of the much needed food and this resulted in women and 
children dying of hunger (Vasagar & MacAskill 2005). This was declared by the international community 
as one of the worst humanitarian crisis ever witnessed in modern history. The United States of America 
declared it a ‘genocide’ that was orchestrated by the Sudanese government on innocent civilian population 
(U.S. State Department Rights Report  2015). 
 
Having noticed the disturbing humanitarian developments taking place in the Darfur, the United Nations 
Secretary General Kofi Annan in October 2004 set up an International Commission of Inquiry whose 
mandate was “(i) to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law 
in Darfur, (ii) to determine whether or not acts of genocide have occurred; (iii) to identify the perpetrators 
of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur; and (iv) to suggest means of 
ensuring that those responsible for such violations are held accountable “(International Commission of 
58 | P a g e  
 
Inquiry 2004:2). The Commission was a result of the Security Council’s Resolution 1564 which in a way 
reflects the international community’s concerns over the deteriorating humanitarian situation unfolding in 
the Darfur.  
 
Although the Commission in principle failed to label the killings as genocide, it compiled a report which 
came out in January 2005. The report incriminated the GoS, the rebel groups as well as the Janjaweed militia 
to be all responsible for the serious violations of the law and further sent fifty-one names to the UN Security 
Council with the report (Yewett 2006:01). The Commission report in particular recommended that the 
Security Council should immediately refer the human rights violations to the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
(Kastner 2007: 164). It was again within the January 2005 Commission report that highlighted the deliberate 
failure by the GoS to arrest, investigate and prosecute those who were responsible for the gross violations. 
The report particularly stated that, “[t]he measures taken so far by the [Sudanese] Government to address the 
crisis have been both grossly inadequate and ineffective, which has contributed to the climate of almost total 
impunity for human rights violations in Darfur” (ICI 2004). 
 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), basing on the contents of the Commission report and other 
sources of critical claims from both local and international human rights, humanitarian and advocacy groups 
passed Resolution 1593 on the 31st of March 2005. The effect of the Resolution was to invoke Article VII 
of the United Nations Charter, thus declaring the Darfur crisis as a threat to international peace and security 
and in turn referred the conflict to the ICC. It is however supringly important to note that although the United 
States of America and China had reservations over the existence of the ICC as an international legal 
institution of the Security Council to which the two states are permanent members agreed to the 
recommendations of the Commission (Kaufman 2006).  
 
With Resolution 1593 having been passed, the ICC was granted jurisdiction over crimes that were committed 
in the Darfur region from as far back as the 1st of July 2002. Part of the resolution insisted the need for the 
Sudanese government and the other stakeholders in the conflict to cooperate with the Office of the 
Prosecutor. This was articulated where it stated, “the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the 
conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor… [and] urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate 
fully.”  
 
The ICC Prosecutor, Luis Morena-Ocampo after assessing the crimes committed during the prescribed 
periods and further establishing the admissibility of Sudan (Darfur) killings, announced the investigations 
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and possible prosecution of those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan 
(Yewett:2006).  
 
The ICC Chief Prosecutor subsequently on the 14th of July 2008 requested from the ICC Pre-trial Chamber 
an arrest warrant for President Omar al-Bashir for ten counts of war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity that were committed in the Darfur region (Tanagho & Hermina 2009:390). The basis for the 
warrant request by the Office of the Prosecutor were centred on President al-Bashir’s intend to commit 
genocide by letting his forces kill men and rape women and children in camps.He was accused of having 
ordered his armed forces to clear the entire history of the Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa tribes through 
manslaughter.  
 
The historic issue of arrest warrant by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to President al-Bashir was conducted 
on the 4th of March 2009. Here the President was being charged for five counts of crimes against humanity 
and two war crimes charges on the grounds that he had played a pivotal role in the rape, murder, torture and 
displacement of millions of civilians in the Darfur region (Tanago & Hermina 2009:390). 
 
The referral of the conflict by the Security Council to the ICC was considered to be one of the many efforts 
by the international community to react against the violations of human rights in the region. This was also 
well received by both the local and international human rights groups as it was perceived to be a deterrent 
measure by the Security Council to the Sudanese government from further engaging and funding the 
Janjaweed militia.  
 
One of the rebel groups that participated in the confict, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) was reportedly 
quoted as suggesting that the ICC’s participation in Darfur was a long awaited intervention. This was mainly 
because it would timeously indict those responsible for the atrocities including the high ranking Khartoum 
administration official such as President Omar al-Bashir and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha (Kastner 
2007:165). The rebels were more impressed by the Security Council’s stance towards the Khartoum 
administration as this would provide a platform for international justice for the affected families and 
prosecution for those who committed crimes with impunity. 
 
The al-Bashir regime is said to have been delegitimized by the International Commission of Inquiry Report 
that publicly announced the names of the government officials that participated in the killings and abuse of 
innocent civilians in the region. This although hailed as a positive step by the Security Council, there were 
some who criticized the move as it was seen as focusing and putting much effort in the future punishment of 
rights abusers than taking immediate action to prevent the mass atrocities (Reeves 2005:26,30).  
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However the Security Council was more calculative and sensitive when dealing with the conflict, more 
particularly on the subject of the ICC and the imposition of sanctions to those involved in crimes commission. 
In order to strengthen diplomatic and political relations between parties involved, both the Sudanese army 
and the rebel forces were to be brought to justice for as long as they were reasonably suspected to having 
committed international humanitarian crimes (International Criminal Court 2007). 
 
(ii)   Khartoum’s reactions 
One would at a point wonder how the Sudanese government reacted on learning that the Security Council 
referred the Darfur conflict to the ICC. How also would the government react to information that the 
Prosecutor intended to have the crimes investigated and if found guilty, the perpetrators would be charged 
by the Hague Court.  
 
The Sudanese national judiciary has been accused of allegedly not taking seriously those who claimed that 
rights violations in the war torn region were taking place and that prosecution had to be prioritized. The 
establishment of the National Commission of Inquiry (NCI) by the government did little for the international 
community to be satisified that the Khartoum authorities were indeed keen to seriously halt the mass killings 
that were taking place in the Darfur.  
 
However, the ICC referral developments came as a shock to the GoS which in turn resulted in the Sudanese 
Council of Ministers calling for the ‘total rejection’ of the ICC. President al-Bashir further pronounced that 
the Government of Sudan would not in any way hand over any of its nationals to the ICC (IRINnews:2005). 
However knowing that the international community expected action from Khartoum, the GoS swiftly 
established the Special Court for Darfur (SCD) in June 2005. The SCD establishment was dismissed and 
condemned by human rights groups such as the Amnesty International alleging that it was the Sudanese 
government’s way of subverting the ICC’s intention to prosecute those responsible for killing and raping 
civilians with impunity (Global Policy Forum:2005). There were further allegations that since the inception 
of the SCD, only a handful of precisely junior officers were arrested and indicted for minor crimes in the 
region while those who committed large scale atrocities were never brought to book (IRINnews:2005). 
 
It is however important to take note of how President Omar al-Bashir personally reacted to the ICC’s intend 
to prosecute him as the head of the government for the genocide, war-crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The Sudanese President categorically denied that genocide and ethnic cleansing took place in Darfur. He 
further indicated that even if he had committed such crimes, the ICC had no mandate to prosecute him and 
his other nationals implicated. The President went on to insenuate that the Rome Statute was a Western 
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project meant to colonize and effect regime change in the country (Arieff, Browne & Margesson 2009:13). 
He further alleged that the ICC project was only meant to infringe on the Sudanese sovereignty. The 
Khartoum government in turn refused the ICC prosecutorial staff to interview Sudanese officials during its 
January-February 2007 visit, alleging that they constituted an imperialist constituency with a hidden agenda 
(Suna News Agency 8 August 2008). 
 
There were also concerns from various local and international rights advocacy groups about the 
government’s hardline approach towards the Sudase citizens who were perceived to be sympathetic to the 
ICC’s mission to prosecuting the regime officials. A human rights activist was in November 2008 arrested 
and detained by the police only to be charged for being in constant contact with the ICC. Another prominent 
Islamist opposition leader was in January 2009 also jailed for advocating for President Omar al-Bashir to 
voluntarily surrender himself to the Hague in order to avert civil strife (AFP  November 26 2008).  
 
The arrests and detentions of both ordinary civilian and vocal proponents of government continued in the 
country and this induced an atmosphere of fear within the entire country. The atmosphere of fear was not 
only confined to the Darfur region but also across the entire country where opposition leaders claiming that 
they were being targeted for calling the President to voluntarily hand himself for prosecution (Osman 2009). 
 
The other notable reaction from the Bashir administration on the arrest warrants was the indiscriminate 
expulsion of international aid organizations which included Oxfarm and Doctors Without Borders (DWB) 
from the country.The reason for their immediate expulsion being that  they were either working for or 
sympathising with the ICC (Heavens 2009). President Bashir further threatened other NGOs, diplomatic 
missions and United Nations peacekeepers that their safety would not be guaranteed in Sudan once the arrest 
warrants were to be effected on the president. The Khartoum administration officials also warned that they 
will retaliate on those who would cooperate with the court and the Prosecutors and government supporters 
rallied behind their president through mass rallies (Edries Ali 2009). 
 
(iii)  Impact of the ICC 
The Security Council by choosing individuals from different warring groups allegedly responsible for 
committing crimes in Darfur was deliberately meant to appear as impartial as possible during the period of 
resolving the conflict. However, the Security Council’s intervention in the Darfur through the ICC resulted 
in a number of challenges both to the GoS and the broader international Community (Kastner 2007:167). 
 
The Khartoum administration became a weakened institution from both within the country as well as on the 
international front following the Security Council’s referal of the government’s human rights violations to 
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the ICC (UNSC Res.1054:1996). From within the country, the governing National Congress Party became 
increasingly unpopular with citizens who started to be critical about the government’s support for the 
Janjaweed militia.  
 
The opening up of media space in Sudan after the ICC’s intervention made it possible for the world to know 
the Khartoum administration’s atrocities in the Darfur through media houses such as the Arabic-language 
Al-Ayam, the Khartoum Mirror and the Al-Jazeera (International Crisis Group 2007). Although the GoS 
threatened to shut down some of the local and international media houses operating in the country, the voice 
of the ordinary people had finally been heard through the intervention of the Security Council and the ICC. 
 
The International Criminal Court’s participation in the Darfur crisis can also be measured on how it coerced 
the Khartoum administration to cut ties with the infamous Janjaweed militia which had been accused of 
indiscriminately violating civilian rights. The initial International Commission of Inquiry by the Security 
Council on the Darfur crisis managed to reveal and document most of the crimes committed by the Sudanese 
army and its Janjaweed allies (Kastner 173:2007). With the GoS fully aware that such criminal acts were in 
the international domain (ICC), it had no other option regarding its policy on Darfur than to exhibit some 
form of restraint through cutting ties with the Janjaweed militia in order to regain some diplomatic 
credibility. 
 
It is however important to note that the Janjaweed militia leadership in the end came to realize that if they 
continued to persecute innocent civilians through the GoS, the ICC could hold them solely responsible. There 
were also fears from the militia that once the strong arm of the international law presses hard on the GoS, 
the Khartoum administration would in the end likely to use them as scapegoats for prosecution (Kastner 
173:2007).  
 
The effects of the ICC’s intervention in the Darfur on the part of the Janjaweed militia can be best explained 
as having been a complex phenomenon. This was largely because during the crisis in Darfur, some rebel 
groups disintergrated into smaller groups, with some employing the fighting patterns and attacks which were 
similar to those of the Janjaweed militia (Power and Interest News Report : 2007). In the context of such 
similarities between the splintered rebel groups and the Janjaweed militia, it became increasingly difficulty 
for the Khartoum regime to take charge of their operations. This also led to the Sudanese government to feel 
that it was a security risk to work with the armed forces that they were not sure of their real identity. 
 
Although it has since been acknowledged that the GoS was the major perpetrator of violence in the Darfur 
civil war, it is however undeniable that the different rebel groups also played their role in human rights 
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violations in the region. This is the basis of the inclusion of one of the Sudan Liberation Army-commander 
on the Security Council Resolution 1672 travel sanction list. It was further suggested that both the SLA and 
Justice and Equality Movement leaders had their names sealed on the list of the International Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur (Flint & de Waal :2005).  
 
Thus in the context of some of the rebel leaders’ involvement in the violations, it meant that the coming in 
of the ICC could have been factored by the rebels to negotiate with the GoS in order to peacefully resolve 
the crsis. With the tacit knowledge that the information of their participation in rights violations is with the 
International Commission of Inquiry, some rebel groups including SLA in the end reluctantly accepted 
responsibility and were prepared to negotiate with the government. 
 
The broader international community was also made to galvanise its effort in engaging the parties in the 
Darfur conflict as a result of the intervention by the ICC through the Security Council. This was achieved 
through the realisation that the ICC being a major and powerful international actor in conflict resolution. 
International media attention significantly grew since the announcement by the Security Council that the 
Darfur crisis would be referred to the Hague. The media attention further grew on the realisation that the 
Office of the Prosecutors (OTPs) would initiate investigations on those who participated in the human rights 
violations in the region (Kastner 2007:176). The issuance of arrest warrants to Ali Kushayb and Ahmad 
Harum by the OTP was widely covered by the international media which ultimately gave credence to the 
international community to commit itself on protecting innocent civilians.  
 
It is also important to note that the international community is best prepared to act on findings that emanate 
from the ICC than that which would come from either Non-Governmental Orgarnisations or national 
governments. In this context, the ICC has thus played an important role in shaping the way the international 
community had to work on the Darfur crisis although the African Union, the Arab League and the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference had objected the referral to the Hague (Arieff, Margesson & Browne 
2009:15). 
 
However, it has to be stressed that the participation of the ICC in civil conflicts to prevent war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide according to both the international criminal lawyers and human rights groups 
can cause more atrocities than preventing (Kastner 2007:177). This is a result of the OTP’s insistence that 
the pepertrators of human rights violations have to be prosecuted according to universal standards and fail 
to consider international political realities. 
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The political realities associated with the March 4, 2009 arrest warrants issued to President Omar Hassan al-
Bashir included the Khartoum administration’s announcement that the ICC had no jurisdiction to indict 
Sudan and that no Sudanese national would be allowed to be interviewed by the ICC officials (The 
Associated Press 11 July 2008). The regional political realities that the ICC prosecutors failed to take into 
cognisance came into effect when all but Botswana, African member states condemned the decision that the 
ICC had taken to prosecute one of theirs (Reuters 3 July 2009). South Africa which is considered to be a 
political and economic hegemony of the African continent also discredited the Security Council’s decision 
to refer the Sudanese crisis to the ICC. Former President Thabo Mbeki insisted that this would jeopardise 
the initiatives by the African Union of settling the crisis through negotiations. Although he endured persistent 
criticism from both the international community and other human rights activists, president Thabo Mbeki 
insisted that the ICC had committed a diplomatic blunder by issuing arrest warrants to president al-Bashir. 
He argued that this would further polarize the parties involved in the conflict. Negotiations on the table was 
the way to resolve the Darfur crisis he suggested. 
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
The analysis of this research is drawn from the constructivism theoretical framework by Alexander Wendt 
and Peter Katzenstein. The distribution and sharing of ideas as culture between states forms the basis of the 
constructivism theory in international politics (Wendt 1999:309). Norms are defined as “shared beliefs”, that 
will ultimately turn into a form of culture. Wendt goes on to highlight that the resultant culture is defined as 
“shared knowledge” which then manifests itself as norms and rules (Wu 2009:88). 
 
Constructivism theorists believe that norms form part of the structure which have causal and constitutive 
effects on agents (Katzenstein 1996:1-32). This is explained by how norms help to define actors’ collective 
approach towards expectations from each other given their prescribed identity. Katzenstein goes on to 
compare the operation of norms with rules that define the identity of actors, “thus having [constitutive 
effects] that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognise a particular identity” (Awu 2009:88).   
 
Norms have also been used and or operated as standards that enact an already prescribed identity with 
regulative effects in order to give directions on proper behaviour on actors. States according to Wendt can 
internalize norms in three degrees:, the first degree of internalization where states observe cultural norms as 
a result of being coerced, the second degree of internalization is when states’ observation is a result of their 
self-interest, while the third degree of internalization is brought about by the states’ perception of these norms 
to be legitimate (Awu 2009:88). 
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In this research, the constructivism theory of international relations is to be used to explore how the 
international community used its ideas, norms, culture and individual states interests to intervene in the 
Darfur conflict in order to protect the rights of the civilian population. In the context of the research, the 
international community is to be constituted by the African Union, China as a close ally of the Sudan 
government, United Nations Security Council, the European Union, the International Criminal Court and 
various Nongovernmental Organizations that contributed to the welfare of the Darfurian population. 
 
The transformation of the Organisation of African Union (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002 signalled 
the changes in attitude towards how the continental body approached peace and security in Africa (Akuffo 
2010:75). While the OAU transformed into accepting and adopting the principle of non-indeference in 
matters to do with internal conflicts amongst member states, the OAU had sacrificed human rights 
observance with the norms of sovereignty, territorial integrity together with non-inteference of member 
states internal affairs. This transformative agenda taken by the AU has resulted in the organisation being 
labelled a “pro-interventionist institution” which has taken the rights of civilians in conflict as a priority in 
the process of enhancing human security in the continent.  
 
The AU states have in this case internalized their “cultural norms” because of self-interest in order to make 
Africa free from human security threats (Wendt 1999:250). The intervention by the AU through 
peacekeeping deployment in the Darfur region was done not by one African state, but was a result of wider 
consultation from within the organisation through “sharing of ideas” and knowledge on peace, security and 
human rights protection. This indeed fulfils the constructivist theory which asserts that, “human interaction 
is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones, that the most important ideational factors 
are widely shared or ‘inter-subjective’ beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 2001:392). 
 
The research has also used the constructionist theory to explain how the Republic of China’s foreign policy 
and human rights approaches changed in relation to the changes in the international cultural norms as well 
as China’s identity and interests. The principle of ‘the responsibility to protect’ R2P which is expoused by 
both the AU and the UNSC emphasizes states’ responsibility to provide civilians in conflict countries 
protection has resulted in greater changes in both international human rights and humanitarian norms (Awu 
2009:88).  
 
On the other hand, China like the OAU initially insisted on the principle of non-inteference and respect of 
independent states’ sovereignty and thus defended the Khartoum government on its human rights abuses in 
the Darfur conflict. This also explains the constructionist paradigm of the two countries’ common identity, 
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culture and norms that they share in economic  and political ties. Beijing was accused by the international 
community to defending the Khartoum government because it sold weapons to the country in exchange for 
the oil from the African country. This principle of mutual and reciprocal sharing of economic, political and 
military cultures and norms between Beijing and Khartoum justifies the theory of constructivism used in the 
research. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: SCOPE, NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
3.1 Introduction  
The conflict in the Darfur region was a civil war between three major parties, the Government of Sudan 
(GoS), the SLM/A and the JEM. These parties participated in one way or another in the violations and abuse 
of civilian rights during the course of the war. The Sudanese armed force is estimated to be 200 000 in 
strength which includes the Popular Defence Force (PDF), the Border Intelligence (BI), as well as the air 
and navy forces, (ICID 2005:27). The PDF was established from within the armed forces through the 1989 
Popular Defences Act. This force is mandated to assisting the government regular forces whenever their 
requirements are necessary and they also contribute in the defence of the country together with dealing with 
national disasters (Popular Defence Act 1989). 
 
Other arms of the GoS forces included the BI, which is an operational unit responsible for military 
information gathering and the personnel is recruited from their local neighbourhood where they have 
extensive knowledge of people’s tribal differences. The other most powerful organ of the GoS armed force 
is the National Security and Intelligence Services (NSIS). The roles of the NSIS included the oversight of 
both internal and external national security threats, monitoring of relevant events and provision of 
recommendations on protection measures (National Security and Intelligence Services Act: 1999).  
 
The GoS forces have also been accused of working in cahoots with mitilias called the Janjaweed (horsemen, 
knights) or Mujahedeen (Slim 2004). Although the GoS vehemently denied ever working in collaboration 
with the Janjaweed, victims of attacks by these militias hinded that they witnessed them working for and 
with the government forces (ICID 2005:31). 
 
3.2  Human Rights abuses 
Human rights groups, humanitarian organisations, governments from within the African continent and the 
entire world became increasingly concerned with the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Darfur 
region, and the manner in which the Khartoum government handled it. The government forces were the 
major perpetrators of violence towards the civilians, more particularly the women and children within their 
vilages (Slim 2004:813). The armed forces combined with the Janjaweed militia would make use of heavy 
artilary to bomb defenceless villagers and destroying entire settlements.  
 
According to one U.S official report, an estimated 574 villages had been destroyed by the government forces 
while 157 were damaged since the middle of 2003 (Straus 2005:127). Reports also suggested that most of 
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these Darfur villages were either burned out and or deserted and that such raids and attacks took place in 
villages where rebels had never been present (Amnesty International 2016:5). This would suggest that the 
intention of government forces attacking the villages was to punish the rebels’ presumed base of support, 
and this would in turn reduce chances of more rebels coming from within the same communities. 
 
The modus operandi by the government soldiers was to target and single out men during the civilian attacks, 
although women and children were not spared too. Sexual violence including rape was a major concern to 
humanitarian observers, while looting and the destruction of property was pronounced in the civilian 
settlements (Straus 2005:127). The violence in the region resulted in an estimated 1.8 million Darfurians 
uprooted from their settlements, 1.6 million displaced within Sudan while another 200 000 fled to the 
neighbouring Chad (ICID 2005:). 
 
The GoS forces indiscriminately attacked civilian villages and communities in all the three Darfur states 
from as early as 2001. These gross attacks intensified in the early 2003, which in itself coincided with the 
escalation of the internal conflict between the government forces and the two major rebel forces in the region 
(the JEM and SLM/A). The GoS routinely denied their participation in the acts of human rights abuses on 
the part of the civilian population. However, the 2005 Report by the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General concluded that this was part of the government’s counter-
insurgency strategy to target the civilian population either directly or through surrogate armed Janjaweed 
militia (ICID 2005:54).  
 
The Commission of Inquiry report further highlighted some of the government forces’ acts of violations of 
both the international humanitarian and human rights laws. Settlements and villages were aerially bombed 
by helicopter gunships, fixed-wing aircraft as well as strafing with automatic weaponry. In conjuction with 
the Janjaweed militia, the government forces were more often visible in the ground assaults. Reports of 
civilian killings, summary executions, massacres, sexual violence including the raping of women and 
children, torture together with looting and torching of civilian property were recorded (ICG 2004:5). 
 
The GoS armed forces committed a number of both International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International 
Human Rights Law (IHRL) violations during the Darfur civil conflict. Some of the violations which included 
unlawful killings, indiscriminate aerial bombings, forced displacements, rape and pillage (Amnesty 
International 2016:16). Since the conflict in the Darfur is a Non-International Armed Conflict under the 
international law, the parties to this conflict, (government armed forces and the two major rebel groups) are 
bound by treaty-based and customary IHL. These parties are required to observe the Articles of the Geneva 
Conventions as well as Additional Protocol 11 to the  Geneva Conventions. 
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Additional Protocol 11 to the Geneva Conventions is more important in the case of the Darfur conflict. This 
is particularly because it provides for the protection of the civilians who are not directly participating in the 
hostilities. Acts of violence against civilians are prohibited by the IHL, and a cardinal rule of UHL requires 
that parties at all times distinguish between combatants and legitimate military objects on the one hand, and 
civilians and civilian objects on the other hand, and to ensure they direct attacks only at the former (AI 
2016:16).  
 
Harm to the civilian population can only be justified if there is a military necessity and if the expected gain 
is proportionate to the harm caused. The human rights violations by the government forces in the Darfur 
conflict such as sexual violence and rape of women and children, attacks on civilian villages and settlements, 
intentional displacements of people from their communities all constitute war crimes under the UHL (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Impunity and Accountability in Darfur 2015:8). 
 
The abuse of power by the government forces in the Darfur conflict to the civilian population came under 
spotlight between January and September 2016. This was when the Amnesty International Report claimed 
that the Sudanese government forces had used chemical weapons during their attack on the Jebel Marra 
residents (Amnesty International 2016). Under the treaty-based and customary UHL, chemical weapons are 
regarded illegal, and their use is prohibited in respect of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of 
Poisonous Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) also 
prohibits the manufacture and use of chemical weapons by any parties to conflicts (AI 2016:17).  
 
Sudan being a signatory to the CWC thus violated Article 1 which states that parties to the Convention agree, 
“never under any circumstances:  
(i) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or 
indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; 
 (ii) To use chemical weapons. 
All the civilians interviewed by the Amnesty International on the use of chemical weapons by the 
government forces were either survivors of the chemical attacks or were taking care of the  victims in the 
Jebel Marra region and highlighted the experiences they encountered during the attack. 
 
It is however important to ascertain whether the human rights abuses such as murder and forcible transfer of 
the population that took place in Darfur on the civilian population took place systematically and that it was 
deliberately made to be a government policy. Once it is established that it was government policy and that 
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the killings were done systematically, then it constitutes crimes against humanity on the part of the 
government armed forces (Grono 2006:626). A co-ordinated cooperation between the government forces 
and the Janjaweed mitilia in targeting the non-Arab ethnic groups and perpetrated various heinous acts 
against them, including poisoning of wells, chasing the victim population into waterless deserts contributed 
to a systematic operation by the government on civilians.  
 
Reports suggested that by early 2012, an estimated 300 000 civilians had been systematically killed by the 
government army, 1.9 million internally displaced while another 250 000 fled to neighboring countries that 
included the Republic of Chad (Kieh, Jr 2013:49). Such figures indicate that the GoS is culpable of crimes 
against humanity through the actions of its military together with the militia. 
 
Cases of crimes against humanity in Darfur by the government forces were also highlighted in the 2013 joint 
report of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The report establishes how government 
institutions such as the Police, the Central Reserve Police, the Border Guards, the Sudan Armed Forces 
(SAF) and the other pro-government paramilitary forces abused their authority. They violated the rights of 
the civilian population with impunity (Human Rights Situation in Darfur 2013:13).  
 
Both the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Sudanese Interim National 
Constitution provide for the exceptional observance and protection of human rights. In this regard, the GoS 
had a constitutional mandate to tame its armed forces and preventing any arbitrary killings of innocent 
civilians (HRSD 2013:13). This however was not the case, as the 2013 UNAMID report revealed that 514 
civilians died, while on the 15th of March 2013, the report confirmed that during a clash between SAF 
personnel and rebel groups in Al-Gunya, four Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were fatally shot while 
two others were injured in Al Salam IDP camp in South Darfur. 
 
The violations of human rights in the Darfur conflict by both government forces and rebel groups in this 
context can thus be categorised into the following forms: 
 
(i) Violations of rights to life 
The United Nations Human Rights Commettee (UNHRC) expressed the significance of the right to life by 
stressing that it constitute, “a supreme right from which no derogation is permitted”. This argument was 
further complemented by the Article 6(1) of the ICCPR which again insists that every human being possesses 
an inherent right to life that no one can be arbitrarily deprived of (International Commission of Inquiry on 
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Darfur 2014:10). The parties to a conflict are therefore urged to take utmost precautions to preventing the 
arbitrary killings of civilian populations.  
 
The Committee in its General Comment No 24 proved for State parties to respect and protect the right to life 
in conflict situations. It is the same Committee that further stressed the importance of proper investigations 
of alleged human rights violations as well as any other forms of international humanitarian law violations. 
In the case of the Darfur conflict, the GoS under the Sudan Armed Forces Act 2007 provides for the arrest 
and prosecution of armed forces involved in the civilian attacks during conflicts (Sudan Armed Forces Act 
2007). 
 
However, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) have since 2003 violated the rights to life to the civilian population 
in the Darfur region with the GoS being accused of not taking actions against its forces. An estimated 70 000 
civilians had been killed in the western Darfur region between February 2003 and January 2005 in a massive 
ethnic violence which also resulted in the more than 1.8 million people being uprooted from their 
communities (Straus 2005:123). The majority of these deaths took place in the hands of the SAF in 
conjuction with their Janjaweed militia counterparts. 
 
The violations of the rights to life of civilians by the SAF and the armed militia was chronicled by the various 
United Nations sanctioned inquiries on the Darfur conflict since it started in February 2003. The findings of 
the Commission about the events that took place in the Anka village, situated in the North of Darfur on the 
18th of February 2004 highlight how the GoS failed to uphold its responsibility to protect the lives of innocent 
civilians. An estimated 400 Janjaweed militia-men and an undisclosed number of SAF members were 
reported to have descended on to the village armed with Kalashnikovs G3s and rocket-propelled grenades 
(RPG). Witnesses highlighted how the government forces bombed the area around the community with 
Antonov aircraft (ICID 2005:67). The attack, according to the Commission, resulted in the death of 15 
civilians with another 8 being injured. 
 
(ii) Violations of Rights to Physical Integrity 
The rights to physical integrity encompases protection of civilian population in civil conflicts against 
personal security threats, life as well as related intimidation or attack (International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur 2015:12). The state has therefore an obligation to prevent rights violations such as inhuman or 
degrading treatment, torture and indignity from its citizens. However cases of violations of the right to 
physical integrity were a daily occurrence in the Darfur conflict, with women and children being the most 
affected. In 2014 alone, according to the UNAMID a total of 411 cases were recorded which resulted in a 
total of 980 civilians being affected. 
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Incidences of government forces being at the forefront of rights violations in the region were highlighted on 
the 21st of June 2014. In the Kass locality which is in the South of Darfur, some SAF forced their entry into 
a private wedding function by the local IDPs. When the  government forces were politely asked to leave by 
the hosts, they responded by indiscriminately firing shots resulting in two quests being wounded (ICID 
2015:13). The GoS forces were found to be on the wrong side of the law as there was no perpetrator who 
was made to be accountable for that incident as the case was reported to the Kass police station. It later 
turned out that when the UNAMID went to check for the outcome of the report they found out that no action 
was taken against the perpetrators.  
 
The indiscriminate killings, abuses and other forms of rights violations to the Darfurians highlighted that the 
impunity of both the SAF and the Janjaweed mitilias continued unabated during the conflict (Nathan 2006:1). 
This is evidenced by the UNAMID report which documented an incident that occurred on the 3rd of June 
2014 when a group of armed militia dressed in the Sudanese armed uniforms attacked Abu Hamra village in 
Mershing, South Darfur. This incident resulted in civilians loosing their valuable property that included 50 
Zaghawa houses that were torched, assaults on civilians and displacement of villagers to Manawashi town. 
 
Cases of torture, abductions, sexual harassment on women and children were widespread in various parts of 
the Darfur region. These cases were not only confined to the general civilian population, but the humanitarian 
staff, researchers, the media and other international activists were not spared either (United Nations 
Commission Human Rights 2005). The major perpetrators of such violations were the GoS armed forces in 
partnership with the Arab Janjaweed mititia.  
 
 
Two international UNAMID contractors were abducted by some unkwown armed men in  Zalingei on the 
29th  of January 2014 in Central Darfur and were only released after some 6 months on the 6th of June 2014 
(United States Department of State 2015:27). The trend of kidnapping and abductions of humanitarian aid 
workers continued to take place in Darfur with the government failing to take appropriate action against 
perpetrators. The UN further reported of armed men abducting and killing an international Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) national staff member on the 3rd of June 2014. His body was later found 
in  the Western Darfur of Kutum on the 2nd of August 2014 (USDS 2015:27). 
 
(iii) Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
Women and girl children remained a vulnerable group of people in the Darfur conflict. These two groups 
endured an extreme Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) in the hands of both the SAF and the 
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various rebel groups. Most of the SGBV took place in concentrated environments such as the IDP camps 
and their respective remote communities. The civilian population stayed in areas where issues of poor 
security conditions have exacerbated the vulnerability of the victims to their perpetrators (ICID 2015:13).  
 
However the challenges that were faced by the victims included the issue of fear of reporting the abuses as 
a result of social stigma associated with women who have been raped or merely sexually abused. The 
reluctance to reporting cases of SGBV is also compounded by the fear of reprisals by victims from 
perpetrators who are coincidentally the security forces in charge of upholding the law (Amnesty International 
:2016). Those cases reported are not investigated and thus fail to get the attention of the judicial system, a 
situation which makes the civilian population distrusting the police who are generally associated with 
impunity in the Darfur communities (HRSD 2013:18). 
 
The majority of cases of SGBV documented by various commissions of inquiry by the UN reflect that the 
GoS forces were responsible for the sexual abuses to the Darfurian women and girl children. The 2015 UN 
sanctioned Commission of Inquiry solicited information from one of the rebel groups, the JEM. In the report 
the JEM alleged that in July 2003 alone in Tawilah, the SAF and the Janjaweed mitilia mass raped an 
estimated 120 women (ICID 2015:60). The inquiry further noted that on all the victims of sexual abuse 
during the period under review, there were no Arab women who were sexually abused. This in turn gave 
credence to the argument that the acts were being perpetrated by a pro-Arab dominated government forces 
who only targeted African women. 
 
(iv) Rights to Freedom of Expression, Association and Peaceful Assembly 
Articles 19 and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) provide for the rights to freedom 
of expression, association and peaceful assembly. Any restrictions to these rights have to be based on 
permissible provisions in the Covenant with legal basis and should be necessary in a democratic society 
(Universal Declaration for Human Rights 1948:20).The GoS in many respects failed to uphold the provisions 
of the declaration by constantly violating citizens rights to freedom of association, expression and peaceful 
assemply.  
 
The exercise of rights to freedom of expression, assemply and associations in the Darfur region was in the 
main constrained by the protracted conflict, unpredictable security conditions. This was further compounded 
by the associated mass civilian displacement that was a direct product of the government armed forces 
(HRSD 2013:22). The national government’s domestic laws have also put restrictive provisions to citizens’ 
rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, in which law enforcement agencies and 
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prosecutorial authorities are empowered to severely deal with unlawful assembying by civilians (Sudan 
Criminal Procedure Code 1991:40). 
 
There have been various incidences of the GoS armed forces being involved in the violations of civilian 
rights. In Nyala, South of Darfur for example, four people who had previously been arrested and detained 
for about two months for their participation in demonstrations in July 2012 were rearrested on the 19th of 
January 2013 on charges of disturbances of public order (HRSD 2013:22). Although the Khartoum 
authorities tried to legitimize the arrests of the civilians and argued that they were carried out to restore 
public order, investigations by the UNAMID revealed that they were not substantiated. On the 19th of 
September 2013, in Nyala, South of Darfur again, the GoS security personnel were witnessed using excessive 
force dispersing peaceful civilians marching to the State Governor’s office. The civilians were protesting 
against the deteriorating security situations in Darfur South in which two people were killed by firearms and 
eleven injured. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR :CONCLUSION, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The civil war in the Darfur region resulted in the enormous suffering of ordinary civilian population from 
persecutions by the government armed force with the aid of the Janjaweed militia. The nightmare of violence, 
physical and psychological abuses which included indiscriminate killings, raping of women, destruction of 
villages and looting of personal belongings made it mandatory for the international community to intervene 
(Totten 2006:60). The after effects of the civil conflict also suggested that by early 2012, an estimated 
300 000 people had died; 250 000 million fled to neighbouring countries as refugees while about 1.9 million 
were internally displaced in various camps within the Darfur region (Kieh, Jr 2013:49). 
 
In order to improve the human rights situation in Darfur, there is need to establish peace as well as halting 
incidences of violence and acts of impunity amongst the perpetrators of such abuses. However it has since 
been established that peace cannot be brought about without justice. In the context of the Darfur violations, 
the Sudanese authorities have since indicated that they were unable and unwilling to investigate and 
prosecute those allegedly accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity as well as genoced crimes 
(International Commission of Inquiry 2014:158).  
 
     Research Findings 
The researcher in the study came up with findings that covers the extent of human rights violations, who the 
perpetrators were, the extent to which the international community intervened in resolving the conflict. On 
human rights violations, the researcher found that women and children were the common victims where the 
perpetrators sexually abused them, while in other cases children would be taken by armed forces to be used 
as child soldiers. Other forms of human rights violations that took place was the displacement of civilians 
internally while others were forced to cross borders seeking refuge in neighbouring Chad. 
 
The researcher also found that the perpetrators of violence in the Darfur conflict on civilians were not only 
confined to the GoS armed forces, the different rebel groups also took part in attacking unarmed civilians. 
The rebels also took part in attacking members of the humanitarian staff whose duty was to supply food aid 
and medical assistance to the civilian population. In some cases, rebel forces also refused entry to journalists, 
peacekeepers and other international observers into their territories. 
 
On the international community’s intervention, the researcher found out that although the Darfur crisis 
received  the required attention from the global community, the level of urgency was comparably low. The 
research deduced that there is an element of selectivity from the international community in as far as 
humanitarian intervention is concerned. The major superpowers such as the United States of America and 
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the United Kingdom were seen to take an impulsive response to the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts while the 
Darfur crisis took that long to even start tabling the discussions on the Security Council agenda. 
 
The research further found out that although the Darfur conflict started in February 2003, the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights reacted by senting a mission to investigate violations in April 2004. The 
United Nations Security Council also managed to adopt Resolution 1593 in March 2005 which was intended 
to refer the Darfur conflict to the International Criminal Court. Another finding which suggest that the 
international community had no urgency in the Darfur conflict was the passing of Resolution 1769 by the 
UNSC. This resolution which was meant for the establishment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid 
Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was only passed on the 31st of July 2007 some four years after the start of 
the conflict. 
 
The researcher furher found that although the international community participated in the Darfur conflict 
resolution, some individual states did not do it for the people of Sudan but for their national economic, social, 
political and military interests. China for example was accused of having neglected the plight of suffering 
civilians because it was alleged to have benefited from the extraction of crude oil in Sudan. The Chinese 
government was also found to have been supplying military wares to the Sudanese regime but knowing that 
it would be used in the Darfur conflict. 
 
Although the United States of America condemned in the strongest terms the human rights violations by the 
Khartoum administration, the researcher reveals that the two government had bilateral agrrements on 
fighting terrorism. The State Department regularily communicated with the top army and intelligence 
Sudanese officers in efforts to solicit information about terrorist activities in the Great Lakes Region. 
  
Article 628 of Section V of the United Nations Security Council backed Commission clearly states that it is 
vital for those accused of having violated the rights of citizens to be brought to a credible and competent 
international criminal court in order for justice to prevail. The same section further states that those victims 
of the crimes that were committed in the Darfur have to be compensated for the pain that they endured during 
the persecutions. 
 
There have been concerns and discussions as to what appropriate time should the international community 
consider necessary to take corrective actions in the event that a state has been found to be massively abusing 
and violating the rights of civilians in the periods of civil conflicts. This has been attributed to by the 
challenges associated with both the international interventionists on one side of the conflict, and the state 
which is alleged to be abusing human rights. The primary question would be, whether the international 
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community should wait thus long for the conflict to deteriorate so that intervention would then be deemed 
to be legal and socially moral. In the main, it can thus be argued that the pursuit for the responsibility to 
protect in the region has failed to accomplish its intended objectives (de Waal 2007:1054). This failure could 
have been caused by the much expectations that physical peacekeeping missions in the region would protect 
the vulnerable civilians without anticipating challenges to be encountered on the ground operations. 
 
In addition to the international community’s failure to adequately provide the much needed protection to the 
vulnerable civilians in the Darfur, the African Union as the immediate custodian of the Sudanese crisis failed 
to accomplish its institutional Charter obligations on the implementation of its R2P norm in the Darfur region 
(Klay Kieh, Jr, 2013:60). This is because the AU failed to anticipate the gravity of human rights violations 
that was perpetrated by the GoS.  
 
The AU failed to anticipate that crimes which incuded genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity 
could be committed in Darfur and that peacekeeping could not have been an appropriate method of 
intervening in the conflict. The failure by the AU to militarily intervene in this conflict was primarily as a 
result of the regional body’s reluctance to acknowledge that the Sudanese government was the culprit and 
that corrective actions had to be taken to protect vulnerable civilians. This failure to militarily intervene has 
contributed to the government of Sudan’s continued committing of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide, fully knowing that there were no consequences. 
 
The events that unfolded in the Darfur conflict between February 2003 and late 2004, during the intial phases 
of the war reflect that the response from both the African Union and the United Nations Security Council 
came much too late (Slim 2004:827). This assertion is premised on the basis that although the Darfur conflict 
had been in both the international and local media since the beginning in 2003, the UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan only raised the link between international responsibility to protection between Darfur and 
Rwanda when he was addressing delegates in memory of the Rwanda mascares in Geneva on the 7th of April 
2004. This argument of the UN coming into the Darfur crisis too late is also evidenced by its fumbling and 
dithering when it came to getting united for the purpose of rescuing the country from the deepening 
humanitarian crisis. One would want to ascertain the UN Security Council’s rationale in only starting to 
discussing the Darfur crisis on the 7th of July 2004 in response to the US State Secretary Colin Powell and 
Kofi Annan’s return from a fact finding mission in Sudan. 
 
Besides the UN, there were other stakeholders which participated along side the AU to finding a lasting 
solution to the conflict in the Darfur. The European Union as an institution contributed through the funding 
of humanitarian initiatives, peace negotiations between the GoS and different rebel groups and peacekeeping 
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operations in the region was part of the broader international community’s contribution for the conflict to 
end. The governments of China, Unted States of America, the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as 
various non-state actors managed to either directly or indirectly assist the people of Darfur during the period 
of the civil crisis.  
 
As the Darfur conflict raged on, the intervention by the AU came about in 2004, when it sent a small 
peacekeeping mission to the region. The mission was endorsed by the UN Security Council to monitor and 
oversee the cease-fire agreement that was signed between the government and the rebels (Keith 2007:154). 
This AU peacekeeping mission which eventually evolved into the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), 
although underfunded and lacked manpower in its operations, was instrumental in enhancing the security 
situation in the region. It was lauded in the UN Security Council Resolution 1707 for the role it played in 
the reduction of large scale-scale organized violence against civilians by the government forces and the 
Janjaweed militia (GAO 2006:45). However, because of the government of Sudan’s restrictive measures on 
the operations of the peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region, the mission was made not to be able to fully 
provide its mandated protection function that it was assigned to peform by the Darfur Peace Agreement 
(International Crisis Group 2005:3). 
 
4.2 Recommendations 
This section covers the recommendations that the researcher proposes in relation to events that unfolded in 
the Darfur region during the course of the conflict. These recommendations are divided into categories, with 
the first one being propositions on the parties that were alleged to have been involved in the gross violations 
of human rights, ie the GoS forces in alliance with the Janjaweed militia  and the rebel groups. The researcher 
further proposes on how the international community could have best handled the conflict as well as 
providing support to the vulnerable civilians in the region. 
 
Recommendation on the GoS 
The serious human rights violations that occurred in the Darfur region in the hands of the government forces 
provide a platform for the international community in conjuction with relevant stakeholders to engage the 
GoS to address civilian marginalizations. The GoS should put in place mechanisms that ensures the 
observance and respect of both the international human rights laws as well as international humanitarian 
laws.  
 
The above mentioned requirement is of paramount importance in the context of serious violations perpetrated 
by the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the Police, the Central Reserve Police, the Border Guards as well as the 
government aligned paramilitary forces. These government institutions presided over the violations of 
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civilians rights to life, physical integrity, freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly and 
participated in the arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of civilians, particularly women and children 
(Human Rights Situation in Darfur 2013:13-19). The 2013 United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur 
report indicated that the government armed forces and the Janjaweed militia participated in these violations 
with impunity. 
 
On the government’s restrictive measures on access to some parts of the Darfur regions where civilians were 
being killed and abused, the researcher would recommend that international community should engage the 
government of Sudan. The engagement should address the issues to do with granting unfettered and 
unimpeded access to these parts of the country by the United Nations peacekeepers, international 
humanitarian groups, media as well as other organizations whose interests would be to assists civilians in 
the region.  
 
According to the Amnest International (2016), once the government allows all the international humanitarian 
actors access to areas such as the Jebel Marra and other Internally Displaced Persons camps, this would 
enhance treatment of the injured civilians, supply of medical requirements as well as uninterrupted 
operations by the specialised medical personnel in the area. The media’s entry into the affected areas would 
enhance the dissemination and smooth flow of information both locally and internationally on the extent of 
human rights lapses in the Darfur region. By restricting the media access to such areas, the GoS hoped to 
block the international community from seeing the human rights violations by the government forces. 
 
The GoS should also take full responsibility for the continued operations of the prox forces, militias and 
other government-aligned armed groups which were in any way official members of recognised military or 
police institutions within the country during the conflict. In the context of the threat posed by the continued 
stay and operations of the government-aligned militia to the civilian population, the researcher would 
recommend their immediate withdrawal and disarmament.  
 
The government has the capacity to withraw and disarm these militias because their operations were 
sanctioned by the government institutions, such as the supply of weapons with others being organized in 
paramilitary structures and within the “Strike Force” groupings (International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur 2005:33). The GoS itself might be reluctant to act on the illegal operations of the Janjaweed militia 
as they are aiding in the suppression and violations of civilians. The international community, ie the African 
Union and the Security Council should engage the GoS to get the militias out of the communities and stop 
the abuse of women and children. 
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In the interest of the ordinary civilian population in the Darfur region, the GoS should prioritise the 
transformation and alignment of the legislative and other state institutions in the country. Of major concern 
for immediate transformation are the National Security Act (2010), the Police Act (2006) as well as the 
Sudan Armed Forces Act which all violated various sections of the International Humanitarian and 
International Human Rights laws. Attention on the transformation of the legislative institutions with regards 
to the Police, Security forces and the Armed forces should be centered on the restoration of the rule of law 
where arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of life have to be revoked. This would also further regulate the 
powers of the police who are constantly accused of arbitrarily arresting and detaining individuals without 
notification of one’s charges. 
 
The re-alignment of the National Security Act should in the main address issues to do with the excessive 
powers bestowed on security authorities arresting suspects without warrants and further detaining them for 
three days only for the purpose of investigations. The Act further bestows the magistrate with powers to 
renew the detention period to two weeks with the accused being not charged. The Act goes on to allow a 
senior magistrate to on weekly basis renew the detention for a period not exceeding six months but in this 
case for an accused who has been charged to allow investigations to take place (Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices 2015:12). This would be presumed to be the abuse of power by the judiciary on the part of 
the suspects who are in this context mainly in the opposition to the government. 
 
In order for peace to prevail in the Darfur region, the parties to the conflict together with the participation of 
the international community ought to strive to establishing transitional justice system. This requirement is in 
tandem with the provisions of Article 56(296) of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in which the 
government is mandated to facilitate equal access of justice to citizens through taking the following steps: 
 
• Increasing the number of courts and judicial personnel including judges and prosecutors in the 
Darfur; 
• Strengthening and utilizing the system of mobile courts; 
• Allocating adequate resources required for the effective delivery of justice, including providing 
necessary land and air transport throughout Darfur for prosecution officials. To this end, the 
government may seek assistance from the United Nations and other peace partners; 
• Ensuring that the Ministry of Justice enforces and supports the discharge of Prosecutorial duties in 
conducting investigations; 
• Ensuring the protection of judicial personnel, victims and witnesses. 
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The international community’s participation in the process of ensuring the realization of transitional justice 
in the Darfur region involves the provision of adequate financial and personnel resources to the Ministry of 
Justice for both the immediate operational costs and training of the judicial staff. This recommendation is of 
paramount importance to the Darfurians mainly because the lack of both financial and personnel resources 
in the judiciary courts have been deliberately designed by the Khartoum authorities to marginalize the 
citizens. The international community had to intervene through funding state institutions in the Darfur as 
way of aiding the judiciary transformation agenda in the region. 
 
In addition to the above argument of enhancing a transitional justice system, the marginalization of the 
Darfur region in the national judiciary configuration calls for the re-alignment of both the neutrality, 
impartiality and independence of its execution. The government should make it a priority to make the people 
of Darfur adequately represented in the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) within the national judiciary 
system. The jucial representation should be appealed across the Court of Appeal, the National Supreme Court 
as well as the Constitutional Court (Article 6 of DDPD:2011).  
 
Such an equal representation, once implemented could have a potential effect of impartially adjudicating 
over the human rights violations that occurred during the conflict including the war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The recommendation on the effective establishment of an impartial judicial system would also be 
of paramount importance in the effective prosecution of those responsible for attacks on the peacekeepers in 
the region including humanitarian staff and UNAMID peacekeepers (Human Rights Situation in Darfur 
2013:28). 
 
In every society where conflict has resulted in physical abuses, killings, looting of properties, displacements 
and psychological inflictions to both women, children, young and old, the principle of justice cannot be the 
only lasting solution to bring peace and stability without advocating for reconciliation between the victims 
and the perpetrators. The history of the Darfur conflict has been complicated by the participation of various 
parties that involve the government, rebel groups from different ethnic origins, militia forces, international 
peacekeepers and the civilian population.  
 
The government should prioritise reconciliation in particular between those who perpetrated violence and 
the victims. This has to be based on the principles of respecting both the international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. The basis of following these presciptions requires that the perpetrators of 
violence have to be legally accountable to their acts during the conflict and that the government has to 
strongly encourage the reconstruction and repairing of social relationships and mobilising for peaceful co-
existence and social cooperation in the Darfur (DDPD 2011:57). 
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During the process of reconciliation, the government should take a centre stage in condemning the atrocities, 
violations of both international humanitarian laws and human rights laws in the conflict. The government 
has a responsibility to further pledge its support to take future measures that would stop such repititions of 
violations. It is also important to take cognizance of the participation of women and the youths who suffered 
persecution during the conflict in the reconciliation process as well as the transitional justice. Both the 
women and youths should be given equal opportunities in defining what the future Darfur has to be.  
 
In the cases of children who participated in the war and violated the rights of civilians as child soldiers, the 
law has to consider them as victims and be treated as in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of 
Child, Protocol to the Geneva Convention, the African Charter on Rights and Welfare of the Child, the 
Beijing Rules. They should further be treated in the same way as other related international juvenile justice 
institutional bodies for fair trial of the children (DDPD 2011:58). It is also important to note that these 
children did not choose to participate in the conflict, but were coerced to join by either the Government of 
Sudan armed forces or the two major rebel groups. 
 
The international community and concerned stakeholders should also note that the conflict in the Darfur 
region resulted in citizens being displaced from within the country, the Internally Displaced People (IDP).  
Others ended up crossing borders into neighbouring countries such as Chad and the Central African Republic 
as refugees (Tanagho, Hermina & Hardin 2009:377). The GoS ought to ensure the restitution of housing, 
land and other properties which were either destroyed or forcibly taken from the refugees and or IDPs during 
the period of conflict. The government ought to process the restitution within the guidelines of the United 
Nations Principles on Housing and Property and the DDPD (Human Rights Situation in Darfur 2013:28).  
 
In the event of the IDPs and refugees failing to recover their houses and land, the government is mandated 
to compensate them in accordance with the international principles. The rights for compensation applies to 
the IDPs and refugees whether they should choose to return to their original homes or they decide to relocate 
elsewhere (DDPD 2011:54). This requirement has to be emphasized mostly because some refugees and or 
IDPs might feel reluctant to go back and face their abusers or to be reminded of the destructions which took 
place on their properties. The government should accord victims rights to financial compensation for the 
losses and harm which they suffered during the conflict, and these should include the loss of economic 
valuables, loss of lives, physical injuries as well as emotional and psychological suffering they encountered. 
 
In addition to the compensation of the IDPs and the refugees by the Sudanese authorities, the GoS and the 
two main rebel groups shoud in the first place create an enabling condition for the affected victims to return 
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to their homes voluntarily without any fears of reprisals and further attacks (DDPD 2011:48). These victims 
should be guaranteed protection from the government in accordance with various international human rights 
benchmarks including the international humanitarian law, the international human rights law, the 
international refugees law together with all the other regional and international instruments that Sudan is 
Party to. In the context of the Sudanese authorities obliging with various international and regional 
intruments, it thus requires monitoring of this obligation from the international and regional community 
including the African Union and the UN Human Rights Commission. 
 
The GoS should also consider eradicating and abolishing hinderances that are experienced by Sexual and 
Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) victims. This the government has to do through seeking redress and 
resourcing the judiciary with specialized prosecutorial personnel (Human Rights Situation in Darfur 
2013:17). In the context of the vulnerability of the SGBV victims, for example an investigation that was 
conducted in 2013 by the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), there were 156 cases 
of SGBV. These involved 162 victims, with the most reported cases being attempted rape, sodomy, rape and 
gang-rape. The investigation further revealed that the statistics given was an under estimation of the actual 
figures of the abused victims.  
 
The under estimation in reporting was due to fears by the abused civilians of further reprisals by the 
perpetrators and social stigmatization after reporting. The distrust of the victims to the police also could have 
led to resentment to report cases of sexual violence. In such cases of citizens failing to report as a result of 
institutional shortcomings, the government has a responsibility to work with the civil societies in advocating 
and educating citizens on the importance of reporting cases of sexual violence, while at the same time taking 
a hard stance on the police for not doing their constitutional mandate to protect citizens. 
 
In addition to the sensitivity of women and children abuses in the conflict, the government should also 
improve on the reforms and strengthening of the legal aid services for the vulnerable people of Darfur. This 
should be implemented through the creation of a Victims Support Fund (VSF) which will compliment the 
works of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) with the Darfur region. With such programs in place, 
the government will be setting a sustainable and effective foundation for the protection of such vulnerable 
communities (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Impunity and Accountability in 
Darfour 2015:22). The protection of women can also be enhanced by the government’s establishment of 
victim and witness units for courts. These will be providing security measures, counselling as well as other 
appropriate help in the process of investigations and trials of cases that occurred during the conflict. 
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Recommendations to the Rebel Groups 
The GoS was not solely to blame for the human rights violations that occurred during the civil conflict in 
the Darfur region. The two major groups that constituted the rebel movement in the conflict were the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Although these two main rebel 
groups were on the receiving end from the government armed forces and the Janjaweed militias, they too 
were accused of participating in the human rights violations but on a smaller scale (Sudan Liberation 
Movement/Army Press Release:2003). Human rights violations attributable to the armed opposition 
movements included the killings of civilians in the Graida, Kile Muzu, Muhajeria and Abu Ajaras in the 
South Darfur (UNAMID Human Rights:2013). There were also reports of rebel groups being involved in 
cases of abducting humanitarian aid workers, journalists, UNAMID peacekeepers as well as participating in 
the recruitment of child soldiers from either the IDP and refugee camps in Darfur and the Blue Nile States 
(United States Department of State Human Rights Practices 2015:30). 
  
In the context of these violations by the opposition armed forces, the researcher proposes that the rebel 
groups have a responsibility to create an enabling environment for the civilians to be protected in their 
communities. Rebel groups should allow access to the areas under their jurisdiction national, regional and 
interanational humanitarian aid organisations in order to facilitate smooth distribution of food and medical 
supplies to the civilian population. The rebel forces should also either allow an unhindered operation of the 
specialized agencies and UNAMID peacekeepers within their areas of jurisdiction or co-ordinate with them 
in promoting the protection of the civilian population from either the government armed forces or the 
Janjaweed militias. 
 
The rebels should also desist from attacking the civilians and or destroying their sources of livelihood. This 
requirement from the rebels is important as most civilians in the region rely on their presence for protection 
from the government armed force and their Janjaweed militia. 
 
Recommendation to the International Community 
Although the international community has been hailed for having played a pivotal role in the protection of 
civilian population in the Darfur region, there were also some shortcomings that have to be addressed in 
order for peace to prevail in the region. The African Union’s participation in the conflict is characterized by 
a combination of zeal and commitment to bring peace in the region through the diplomatic approach and 
peacekeeping deployments but capacity and resources deficiency crippled the desire to accomblish the 
intended objectives (Mansaray 2010:42).  
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The United Nations Security Council on the other hand only managed to adopt Resolution 1769 on the 31st 
of July 2007, which authorized the deployment of the UNAMID in the Darfur, some five years after the 
conflict started (Badescu & Bergholm 2009:  300). The mission only became operational on the 31st of 
December 2007, some five months after the adoption of the Resolution. What further complicated these 
developments was that the number of operational personnel on the ground was far less than what was 
authorized. By November 2008, the number of UNAMID peacekeepers on the ground were pegged at 
15 444, nearly half of the actual authorized deployment of 26 000 troops (United Nations, 2008).  
 
As part of the international community, both local and international humanitarian organizations became 
more and more frustrated by the Khartoum administration which refused them access to the civilians who 
needed food and medical supplies. With such restrictive environment from both the government and some 
rebel groups, some humanitarian organizations that were assisting an estimated civilian population of 4.2 
million proposed to withdraw from their operations citing fatigue and funding constraints as reasons (United 
Nations News, 2008b). A combination of the failure by the Security Council to provide adequate 
peacekeepers for civilian protection and the threat by the humanitarian organizations to withdraw from the 
Darfur region resulted in the citizens beginning to lose hope in the capacity of the international community 
to helping them (Reuters, 2008). 
 
The Afican Union 
Article 4(h) and 4(j) of the African Union’s Constitutive Act prescribes that “the AU has the right to 
intervene, ‘in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’ and in cases of a serious threat to legitimate 
order, in order to restore peace and stability to the member states of the Union, upon the recommendation of 
the Peace and Security Council and includes ‘the right of Member States to request intervention from the 
Union in order to restore peace and security.” Since the intervention by the AU in the form of the AMIS 
forces was crippled by logistical and other operational challenges, the AU should invest in institutional 
capacity building on peace and security in order to avoid the outside world from interfering with its peace 
operations. 
 
The bulk of the US$26 million budget for the initial 124 military and civilian AMIS personnel and another 
24 support staff in April 2004 was solicited from the European Union, United States of America, Germany, 
United Kingdom and Canada. This situation resulted in the continent being vulnerable to political and 
economic manipulation from these perennial funders (Akuffo 2010:80). The African Union has been 
receiving funding from the external world for its routine operational imperatives and this has been the major 
shortfall in the institutional capacity of the continental boby. 
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It is also important to highlight that the deployment of the AMIS forces in the Darfur came about after 
negotiations between the government and the rebel groups, with the AU and the rest of the world assisting. 
However, there were a number of challenges that were associated with the route of resolving the conflict 
through diplomatic means as most agreements signed thereafter were violated by either parties. For example 
the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks which brought about the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was 
applauded for its initiatives to protect the rights of civilians in both communities and IDPs. The violations 
and breaches to the signed agreement resulted in the displacement  and death of more than 300 000 people 
in 2008 (Akuffo 2010:80). Such violations include the government’s continued working with the Janjaweed 
militia to perpetrate violence against civilians in camps and in their communities (Appiah-Mensah 2010:12).  
 
The African Union through it’s Peace and Security Council should thus prescribe strong measures that have 
to be taken against parties to a negotiated agreement who willy nilly breach the terms and conditions of the 
agreement. It is through this AU weakness that the researcher prescribes that the continental body should 
impose strong sanctions to the Khartoum regime for breaching the terms of the signed agreements as well as 
continued violations of human rights in the Darfur. Not only should the GoS be sanctioned for its renaging 
on fulfilling the terms of the signed agreement, the rebel groups should also be sensored for their failures to 
honour what would have been agreed in the negotiation processes. 
 
The African Union should also pull its resources in putting more pressure on the government of China for 
its reluctance to play a more constructive role in resolving the Darfur crisis (Keith 2007 :159). China has 
recently been Sudan’s biggest trading partner, with 64% of Khartoum’s oil being purchased by the Chinese 
and more of its companies having invested in the Sudanese petroleum industry (Reeves 2006). This in itself 
suggest that the Chinese have much economic dependence on the Sudanese government and the African 
continent broadly, but a closer analysis will reveal that this relationship is mutual. Whereas Beijing depends 
on the oil reserves in Khartoum, Sudan has also benefited from the arms imports as well as donor funding 
from China that has made its military to sustain the economic sanctions and arms embargos from the west 
(New York Times 2006).  
 
In the context of African states being manipulated by the developed countries such as the Chinese, it is 
important for the African Union to stand by itself and invest its resources in building instutional frameworks 
that promote and enhance human rights and democratic transformation. The continent should also engage 
the developed world on socio-economic development programmes and investments that are not attached to 
conditionalities such as those with less governance-related strings (Kurlantzick 2006). That resonates with 
the proposition by the former South African President Thabo Mbeki that the NEPAD project is best suited 
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for the socio-economic and infrastructural development in the African continent. This however he stressed 
should be attached to the regimes’ commitments to uphold good governance and accountability to citizens. 
 
 
The South African Government 
Outside of the African Union, South Africa being the largest economy in the African continent should play 
an important role in bringing peace in the Darfur region. Although the South African foreign policy 
advocates for diplomacy as the primary route to resolving international conflict, Pretoria has on a number of 
occasions been seen to lean towards the GoS and seemingly being aggressive towards the rebel groups 
(Nathan 2008:1).  
 
South Africa has consistently sought to renage on efforts by both the international community and other 
human rights defenders to take a strong hand on the GoS against its human rights violations on citizens 
(Human Rights Watch 2007a). Acting on its capacity as the newly elected member of the UN Security 
Council, Pretoria supported Khartoum to reject proposals for sanctions against combatants and militias who 
attacked civilians and refusing to accommodate the UNAMID forces in the Darfur. In the main, South Africa 
has shown its leniency towards the incumbency (the Sudanese authority) at the expense of numerous human 
rights violation since the onset of the Darfur conflict in February 2003 (Prunier 2005). 
 
In order for peace and security to prevail in the Darfur region and in Sudan broadly, the South African 
government has to be seen showing signs of neutrality between the government and the rebels during 
negotiations and other international engagements. The calling of international action against the rebel leader 
Abdel Wahid al Nur for his refusal to participate in the Sirte talks by Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Omar al 
Bashir only led to the legitimacy of the Darfur Peace Agreement being undermined (Nathan 2008:8). The 
position of Pretoria siding with the incumbency that flouted human rights is in sharp contrast and inconsistent 
with its historical struggle against oppression as well as aligning to its constitutional values of promoting 
good governance, democracy and human rights (Department of Foreign Affairs 2004). 
 
The South African government should not have in the first place had prioritized the successful 
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the National Congress Party (NCP) and 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) without engaging the parties in the Darfur region. The 
CPA is regarded as the proximate cause of the Darfur conflict as it contained new economic, political and 
constitutional provisions for the entire Sudan but excluding the Darfurians. Contradicting the contents of the 
CPA, President Thabo Mbeki claimed that the agreement inhibited the conflict resolution (Nathan 2008:9). 
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It later emerged that part of the rebels’ demands at the Abuja talks were the amendmentment of the CPA, to 
which both the SPLA and the NCP steadfastly refused to endorse. 
 
If Pretoria is to be considered as Africa’s big brother in promoting peace, security and human rights in the 
continent, it has to devise a mechanism of avoiding blocking international action against dictatorial 
governments and start to engage parties that promote the rights of the most vulnerable  and poor citizens. It 
is through this narrative of the South African government’s refusal to acknowledge that the Khartoum 
administration has to be held accountable for its human rights violations which makes the international 
stakeholders to not taking Pretoria seriously in resolving the Darfur crisis. 
 
The United Nations Security Council 
With the challenges that the AU had with the AMIS’s operations in Darfur, the United Nations Security 
Council has to establish a permanent presence of UNAMID peacekeepers in volatile sections of the Darfur 
such as the Jebel Marra (Amnesty International 2016:97). The UNAMID peacekeepers’ presence in such 
regions should be precisely to protect civilians from both government armed forces and the rebels as well as 
allowing the humanitarian organizations to distribute much needed medical supplies and food to the 
vulnerable citizens.  
 
The composition of the UNAMID forces should be predominantly from the African states or resemble an 
African character in order to conform to the demands that the Khartoum administration has been calling for 
before the adoption of Resolution 1769 by the Security Council (Akuffo 2010:79). The presence of the 
UNAMID peacekeepers in the Darfur should also be used as an opportunity to carry out intensive 
investigations into the alleged violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human 
Rights Law by both the members of the rebel groups and the government armed forces. 
 
The UN Security Council in conjunction with the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) should 
apply more political pressure to the Khartoum administration so that it abandons its strategy of denying 
access some parts of the region to members of the UNAMID and other humanitarian actors (AI 2016:97). 
Areas that the government had constantly refused entry to international organizations include the Jebel Marra 
where the government armed forces were alleged to have used chemical weapons to fight rebel.  
 
The AU and the UNSC should in such circumstances initiate an investigation by the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to identify the individuals, groups or government officials who 
participated, organized, sponsored or indirectly facilitated the use of chemical weapons in the Jebel Marra. 
In order for the outcome of the investigation to be objective, there has to be a creation of the OPCW-United 
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Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism which would reach out to all parties to the conflict together with 
human rights representatives in the region. The outcome of the investigation can be used as part of evidence 
by the international community to enforce the already in place United Nations arms embargo on Darfur, 
including its expansion to cover the whole country. 
 
However, it has to be noted that the issue of exerting pressure to the GoS through economic sanctions and 
international arms or oil embargos might not be a deterrent measure for Khartoum to change its attitude 
towards human rights violations in the Darfur. This is broadly because the government has largely been self-
producing both small and medium scale arms for the Janjaweed militia in large quantities (Reeves: 2004). 
The Russians and Chinese have not been part of the international community that advocated for the isolation 
of the GoS and have been in the fore-front in the establishment of the dual-use production facilities such as 
the the GIAD complex which had a capacity of producing top of the art tanks as the the Russian model T-
15.  
 
With such economic, political and military support from two of the best economies in the world plus the oil 
reserves in the country, Sudan would be in a better position to resist and sustain both economic sanctions 
and arms embargo from the rest of the international community. However, the international community can 
still put a military import pressure on Khartoum through the servicing of the helicopter gunships that the 
government has been frequently using in both the Darfur region and South Sudan. 
 
The International Criminal Court 
Although there have been resistance from some in the international community, notably the African Union, 
China and Russia on the advisability of referring all the crimes committed in Darfur to the International 
Criminal Court, the UN Security Council successfully referred it on the basis of humanitarian emergency 
(Reeves 2005). The grounds under which the African Union opposed the Darfur conflict to be referred to the 
ICC were that the Rome Statute was only targeting cases originating from African states while Rusia and 
China felt that the sovereignity of African states were not being observed (du Plesis, Maluwa & O’Reilly 
2013:2).  
 
However, both the AU and the ICC have an obligation to work together in the best interests of peace, security 
and development in both Darfur and the entire African continent. Before African states can start to cry foul 
about being targeted by the ICC, there should be innumerable changes in institutional frameworks that enable 
good governance, human rights observance, judiciary transformation and public accountability. These 
changes should be in direct response to allegations that Africa has experienced most of the atrocities across 
the world which would naturally call for the ICC to take action. 
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African states should take pride in the ICC and let the Prosecutors work on the cases referred to the institution 
partly because they are state parties to the Rome Statute. It is also vital to highlight that African states’ pride 
in the ICC has to sterm from the fact that they actively participated in its negotiations in the late 1990s 
together with other African NGOs through the International Coalition for the ICC.   
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